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ABSTRACT
Using an online experimental survey we investigate perception (in terms of understanding, riskiness
and control) and valuation (elicited using iterative multiple price lists) of lifetime annuities relative to
flexible drawdown products. We find that for those participants who are engaged with the experimental
tasks information provision can substantially reduce or eliminate be-havioral drivers of the complex task
of valuation of annuities. Providing balanced information and multiple opportunities to learn about the
key features of the products, including impact of potential outcomes, narrows the gap between the
willingness to pay and willingness to accept, and, offsets the effects of low financial capability,
information framing and real world institutional settings.
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1 Introduction and motivation
There has been a shift in most developed countries from guaranteed lifetime pensions, such as defined 
benefit (DB), to defined contribution (DC) pension schemes (OECD, 2017). This trend allows for alter-
native products such as phased withdrawals or lump sum arrangements which provide more flexibility 
than traditional pension arrangements. Examples include the U.K. following the abolition of mandatory 
deferred annuitization in 2015 (Cannon et al., 2016); Australia’s superannuation system which allows 
retirement savings to be allocated to annuities, phased withdrawal products (known as account-based 
pensions) and lump sums (Bateman, 2016); and the Netherlands which is considering reforms which will 
provide more choice of pension plan withdrawals (Bovenberg and Nijman, 2017). As a result retirees are 
increasingly asked to select a portfolio of retirement benefit products - typically comprising a lifetime 
annuity product and a product which allows flexible withdrawals from a pension account.
However, poor knowledge of product features and of the risks faced in retirement may offset the 
advantages of freedom of choice. Choosing a retirement benefit or a portfolio of benefits is a complex 
decision. Life annuities and flexible withdrawal products can have an array of different options and char-
acteristics which are often not well understood, particularly by those with low levels of financial capability 
or product knowledge (Bateman et al., 2016a). Moreover, the recent policy shift and introduction of new 
retirement income products has provided limited opportunities for social learning from peers or elders 
(Bernheim, 2002).
The growing literature on retirement benefit decisions has investigated optimal allocations to retire-
ment benefit products, including annuities and flexible drawdown products (Maurer et al., 2013) and 
rational and behavioral explanations for lower levels of annuitization than predicted by theory (Brown, 
2009). Behavioral explanations have explored information framing (Brown et al., 2008b; Agnew et al., 
2008; Bockweg et al., 2018), mental accounts (Brown et al., 2017a), complexity and cognitive constraints 
as revealed by widely divergent values for the WTP and WTA annuities (Brown et al., 2017b), financial 
capability and effort in understanding product features (Bateman et al. 2016b), stickiness to defaults 
(Benartzi et al., 2011; Butler and Teppa, 2007), and the use of heuristics (Bateman et al., 2016a).
In this paper we contribute to the growing literature on retirement benefit decisions by studying the 
perception and relative valuation of lifetime annuities versus flexible drawdown products in a cross-country 
context where we provide multiple opportunities to learn about product features and the implication of  
potential choices. Our countries of investigation are Australia and The Netherlands which have similar 
multi pillar retirement income arrangements, yet quite different payout structures. The Dutch mandatory 
income
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replacement pillar is almost always annuitized, while Australian retirees are offered choice of retirement 
benefit, with most taking flexible withdrawal products (Bateman et al., 2016b; OECD, 2017).
We designed and implemented an online experimental survey of annuitization choices using iterative 
multiple price lists (iMPLs) to elicit revealed preferences, which we fielded to representative samples of 
approximately 1,000 Dutch and 1,000 Australian pre-retirees aged 50-64 in June 2017. The experimental 
design involves five between-subject treatments - country (Australia, The Netherlands), marital status 
(single, married), household income (4 levels), information framing (consumption gain, consumption loss, 
investment gain, investment loss) and product endowment (WTA, WTP). To elicit annuitization pref-
erences we presented participants six within-subject iMPL tasks. These tasks differ by the benchmark 
allocation of retirement assets between an annuity product, which we call a Lifetime Guaranteed Income 
product, and a phased withdrawal product, which we call a Flexible Account product. Before completing 
the six iMPL tasks participants are asked about their perception of the two products in terms of under-
standing, riskiness and level of control. This allows us to examine how participants perceive and value 
the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product relative to the Flexible Account product.
A feature of the experimental design is that participants are provided with multiple opportunities to 
learn about the two retirement benefit products. First, before completing the six iMPL tasks, participants 
are presented with general information about the two retirement benefit products (which differ by frame). 
Second, they then complete an incentivized product knowledge review quiz for which their responses are 
reported as “correct” or “incorrect”. Third, participants are asked about their perception of the two 
products (in terms of understanding, risk and control), which induces them to further reflect on the product 
features. Fourth, when completing each of the six iMPL tasks participants are reminded of the key product 
features (which differ by frame), and finally, to assist with their choice for each iMPL, participants can elect 
to use an on screen interactive retirement calculator, which shows the possible implications of the take-up 
of the products. These design features allow us to investigate the impact of information provision and 
framing on annuitization decisions. Another feature of the experimental design is that participants are 
randomly assigned to either the WTP or a WTA condition, which allows investigation of the endowment 
effect. In addition, the six within-subject iMPL tasks have different benchmark product portfolios which 
enables investigation of access to liquidity. The comprehensive set of covariates we collect allows us to 
examine the influence of personal characteristics, access to financial resources, financial capability, 
propensities to save and plan for retirement and personality traits, and perceptions on and valuation of 
annuities relative to flexible drawdown products.
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In terms of perceptions, we find that participants who are financially competent and engaged with the
experimental survey are better able to understand the product features. Framing effects are present for the
Dutch, and participants who have thought more about retirement planning and have a need for income
in retirement have a better understanding of the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product. Institutional
effects are strong, with Australian participants showing less understanding of the Lifetime Guaranteed
Income product, with which they are unfamiliar due to Australian design where flexible drawdowns are
the product of choice and the voluntary annuity market has, until recently, been almost non-existent
(Iskhakov et al., 2015).
For the valuation of annuities (the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product) relative to the flexible
drawdown product we confirm earlier studies by finding a gap between the WTP and the WTA. However,
the gap in our study is much smaller than in earlier work (Brown et al., 2017a), which we attribute to our
experimental design, specifically the repeated opportunities to learn about the products and the provision
of a retirement calculator to illustrate potential outcomes. We find limited effects of information framing,
which is restricted to participants less engaged in the experimental survey, and confirm earlier studies
by finding the influence of wealth illusion: that is, participants with higher income value annuities more
than those with lower income.
Our study is related to several strands of the literature investigating demand-side explanations for
the miniscule interest in longevity products, including the role of information framing; cognition, effort
and engagement; and the endowment effect.
Literature on “framing” and annuitization decisions has focused on the impact of alternative pre-
sentations of the key product features. Brown et al. (2008a) show that participants are more likely
to consider annuities a good retirement choice when presented in a consumption frame (emphasizing
spending and living standards) relative to an investment frame (focusing on rates of return and assets).
Similarly, Beshears et al. (2014) find significant reduction of the proportion of wealth annuitized under
the investment frame and the frame highlighting flexibility and control of a lump sum. Agnew et al.
(2008) consider the impact of loss and gain frames and find that participants are more (less) likely to
opt for the annuity option if the provided information favorably biased towards annuities (investment).
In the context of Social Security Benefits (SSB) claiming in the U.S. Brown et al. (2016) find no effect
of consumption frame versus investment frame although this could be explained by U.S. retirees being
more familiar with SSB than annuities, which would make them more capable of making the tradeoff
between regular income and a lump sum. Finally, in the context of a large Dutch pension fund Bockweg
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et al. (2018) find heterogeneity of framing impacts across demographics, risk attitude and institutional 
environment.
We contribute to this literature by studying consumption gain/loss, investment gain/loss framing of 
annuities in a cross country context to investigate the impact of real-world institutional differences. We 
do so by implementing the same experimental task to Dutch (familiar only with full annuitization of 
state and private pension benefits) and Australians (familiar with annuitized state pension benefits but 
full flexibility of private pension benefits). We also supplement the “framed” information with multiple 
opportunities to learn about product features and potential outcomes. While we find minimal framing 
effects overall we do find that real-world institutional settings matter for perceptions of the flexible 
drawdown products by the Dutch, who have no real-world experience with such products. As well, less 
engaged participants are more likely to be influenced by information framing.
More recent literature has considered the importance of cognition and effort on retirement benefit 
decisions. Brown et al. (2017b) find that complexity of an annuity product reduces participants’ ability 
to value annuities although broad bracketing - jointly thinking about the annuitization decision and 
the pace of how quickly to spend down assets in retirement - increases participants ability to value these 
products. Bateman et al. (2016a) find that more numerate participants who put effort into understanding 
product features chose more longevity insurance at higher ruin risks. We contribute to this literature by 
investigating the impact of repeated opportunities to learn about product features as well as potential 
outcomes, using an interactive calculator on perception and valuation of annuities of both engaged and 
less engaged participants. We less find less confusion in annuity valuation (measured by the gap between 
WTP and WTA) than in prior studies.
Finally, a related strand of the literature on the attractiveness of annuities has investigated the effect 
of the reference point (or endowment effect). Brown et al. (2016), Brown et al. (2017b) and Brown et al.
(2017a) all show a significant endowment effect (status quo effect) in the valuation of SSB. For those 
Americans in receipt of SSB the value of buying an additional $100 monthly SSB is much less than selling 
the additional $100 monthly SSB. In related work Reb and Connolly (2007) show that the main driver of 
the divergence between WTP and WTA is due to subjective feelings of ownership.1. As in these studies 
we investigate the endowment effect by analyzing the gap between WTP and WTA. We also find an
1Whereas delaying SSB is a way to annuitize wealth, caution should be taken to extrapolate these findings to private
retirement benefit decisions. First, almost half of Americans either claim SSB at the earliest age that they qualify for it or
when they retire (Munnell and Chen, 2015). This indicates that they might not see delaying SSB using savings to provide
an income for some years- as purchasing a (cheap) annuity. Second, people’s attitude towards the government and the
(political) risk associated with SSB may play a role in the perceived attractiveness of SSB
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endowment effect, however the gap (between WTP and WTA) in our study is much smaller, particularly 
for engaged participants. We attribute this to our experimental design which reduces cognitive load 
through multiple opportunities to learn about the product features and the interactive calculator which 
provides potential outcomes from alternative product choice.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the experimental design, including the five between-
subject treatments and the six within-subject iMPL tasks, and describes the covariates we collect. Section 
3 reports regression results on perceived understanding of the retirement benefit products, while section 
4 analyses the factors that explain the valuation of annuities relative to flexible drawdown products. 
Section 5 concludes.
2 Experimental survey design
We designed and implemented an experimental survey to investigate the effect of information provision 
(including framing), the endowment effect, and the influence of personal characteristics on annuitization 
decisions. In the experimental setting participants are asked to select portfolios of retirement benefit 
products comprising life annuity and phased withdrawal products. We refer to the lifetime annuity as a 
“Guaranteed Lifetime Income product”, and the phased withdrawal product as a “Flexible Drawdown 
product”, and carefully describe key product features in order to address pre-existing lack of awareness and 
understanding (Bateman et al., 2016a). The Guaranteed Lifetime Income product includes state pension 
payments, and we remind participants of this each time they complete a task. We utilize revealed 
preferences elicited from iterative multiple price lists (iMPL) to allow us to control for information 
provision, and the experimental setting allows us to conduct a cross country analysis by minimizing 
effects induced by institutional arrangements.
In June 2017 we surveyed 1,000 Australians and 1,003 Dutch aged 50-64 who are either not retired 
or part of a couple where at least one is not retired. Participants were sourced from a panel maintained 
by Survey Sampling International who manage a subject pool of over 500,000 Australians and 300,000 
Dutch. Participants were paid up to A$7 in Australia and e5 in the Netherlands for a completed 
survey, which had a median time of completion of 35 minutes. Screen shots of the Australian and 
Dutch surveys are available in the Supplemental Materials, and live versions of the two surveys can be 




The use of multiple price lists (MPL) to elicit willingness to pay has a long tradition in economics and
decision making: see for example Kahneman et al. (1990). The advantage of the MPL method is that it
is relatively straightforward to elicit preferences where participants are presented with a range of ordered
prices and asked to indicate “yes - I would choose” or “no I would not choose” for each price. A
disadvantage, observed in prior studies, is that participants may exhibit multiple switching behavior, in
contravention to economic theory (see e.g. Bruner, 2011; Holt and Laury, 2002 or Goeree et al., 2003).
To prevent such seemingly irrational behavior, Harrison et al. (2005) introduced switching MPLs
(sMPL). In a sMPL monotonicity is enforced by asking a participant to select one switching point. This
is enabled by using a price list where the participant indicates for one of the trade-offs whether he prefers
’Option A’ or ’Option B’, and the other trade-offs are filled automatically. Hence, for the trade-offs on
the price list above the one selected, the choices will automatically be set to ’Option A’ and for the
trade-offs in the list below the one selected the choices will automatically be set to ’Option B’. The
sMPL mechanism has several advantages. First, it reduces effort since the participant is required to
select just one of the options to indicate preferences for all trade-offs on the list. Second, as the order of
attractiveness of the trade-offs on the list is explicit, it enhances participant understanding of the task,
which reduces cognitive load.
An extension of the sMPL method is the iterative MPL (iMPL) method which consists of multiple
(typically two) rounds of sMPL. In the second round participants are asked to refine their choice from
the first round. The range of alternatives presented in this second round are between the two alternatives
from which the participant has switched from ’Option A’ to ’Option B’ in the first round. Andersen
et al. (2009) show that the iMPL method generates more precise estimates and tends to mitigate initial
presentation and order effects that are present with the MPL method. This is particularly important in
retirement savings allocation, as previous studies (see e.g. Hedesstrom et al., 2004; Bateman et al., 2017)
have shown that such decisions are prone to heuristic choice rules.
The advantage of using iMPL is that, with limited number of alternatives presented to a participant,
we can create a multiple of this number of alternative switching points (including always choosing Option
A and always choosing Option B) without overloading the participant with choice alternatives. In the
experimental task, which we will discuss in Section 2.3.4, the participant has to consider only five trade-
offs in the first stage of the iMPL and four trade-offs in the second stage. This creates 30 switching
points. Yet, in order to implement the iMPL, we need participants to switch only once.
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Table 1: Between subject treatments
Treatment # of conditions Characteristics of conditions
Country of residence 2 NL/AU
Marital status 2 Couple/Single
Retirement income (for full annuitization) 4 See Table 2
Information framing 4 Consumption Gain/ Consumption Loss/
Investment Gain/ Investment Loss
Product endowment 2 WTA/WTP
2.2 Between subject treatments
The experimental survey is designed with five between-subject treatments and, as discussed in Section
2.3.5 six within-subject treatments (iMPL tasks). The survey starts with preliminary questions to screen
for the required sample characteristics and to allocate participants to the between-subject treatments.
The treatments are summarized in Table 1.
The first treatment is the country of residence. There are two treatment groups: Australia and the
Netherlands. The difference between these treatments is the language of the survey instrument (English
versus Dutch) and the currency (A$ versus e) used in the survey and tasks. Currencies are converted
using pricing power parity (PPP).2
The second treatment relates to the marital status of the participant with two treatment groups:
single, part of a couple. We consider the annuitization decision to be a household decision and therefore
this distinction is relevant. For participants who are part of a couple, the annuity (referred to in the
experimental task as a Lifetime Guaranteed Income product) is joint with two-thirds reversion to the
survivor, whereas a single participant is presented with a single life annuity. Therefore, information for
a participant who is part of a couple is presented as “you and your partner”, whereas for a single it is
presented as “you”, and the values in the experimental task use different prices for the single life annuity
and the joint and survivor annuity.
The third treatment relates to the participant’s net retirement income. Participants are allocated
to one of four post retirement (net) income groups using their answer to a question on current gross
household income which we ask at the beginning of the survey. The allocation is made such that it
roughly aligns to the household income the participant typically could expect when retired. We take
this approach to ensure that a participant’s hypothetical retirement wealth (either (partially) annuitized
or not) in the experimental context is reasonably well aligned with their personal circumstances. The
advantage of doing so is twofold. First, it makes the experimental task more relevant to the participant
2Using OECD PPP, e1 = A$1.729958 see http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?datasetcode=SNA\_TABLE4.
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and reduces the possibility that the participant is alienated by an unrealistic hypothetical situation.
Second, the treatment allows us to investigate the effect of the retirement income distribution on the
attractiveness of annuities.
We use a participant’s current gross household income as a proxy for post-retirement income, rather
than their actual retirement savings at retirement, for two reasons. First, it allows us to perform a cross-
country analysis between two countries with two different retirement systems (e.g. in the Australian
DC system the accumulated balance is actual retirement savings, whereas in the Dutch DB system,
retirement savings are represented as accrued retirement income). Second, we expect that participants
may not know their current retirement savings, let alone the retirement savings they would have accrued
by the time they retire. Given that both Australia and The Netherlands have a mandatory retirement
saving scheme, we judge that using household income as a proxy may have a smaller reporting error than
a retirement savings question. A further advantage of using the income distribution (and state pension
level) in Australia and the Netherlands is that they are very comparable, which makes it a suitable
mechanism for allocating participants to one of four treatment groups in the cross-country analysis. The
cut-off points for gross household income are set using Australian household income quartiles.3 The four
income treatment groups (net retirement income level in case of full annuitization) for each of Australia
and the Netherlands are presented in Table 2.4
The last two treatments relate to the framing of the product information and the product endowment,
which are discussed in detail in the next subsection.
2.3 The experimental task
After the initial screening and income treatment allocation question the participant proceeds to the
experimental task, which has six stages. First, the participant is presented with information about the
two retirement benefit products included in the experimental task. Second, the participant completes an
incentivized product knowledge quiz. Third, the participant is asked about his/her perception of the two
3The numbers are rounded from ABS Table 6.4 http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/DetailsPage/6523.
02013-14?OpenDocument and rounded to the closest 2,500. Dutch values were obtained by converting these values into
euros using PPP and rounded to the closest 2,500. These align well with the Statistics Netherlands average gross household
income for 55-60 year old of e17,500; e35,300; e60,800; and e128,700 for the four quartiles.
4For the middle income groups, the allocated net retirement income are set by taking the average of the lower and upper
income levels for both the Netherlands and Australia (converted using PPP) and multiplied with 0.7 (income group 2) and
0.65 (income group 3) to account for income tax and replacement rate. For income group 4 we take the average between the
Netherlands and Australia (using PPP) of the lower level of income group 4 plus half of the increment of income group 3
and multiplied that with 0.6. For income group 1 we take the average between Australia and the Netherlands (using PPP)
of the corresponding upper income level and multiply it with 0.82 (note that for people with only state pension, Australians
do not pay any income tax, and Dutch only pay around 5% average income tax).
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Table 2: Household income levels
Group Gross household income Full annuitized
Lower level Upper level retirement income (net)
Australia (A$)
1 47,500 38,980
2 47,500 79,999 44,261




2 27,500 44,999 25,585
3 45,000 74,999 38,756
4 75,000 52,579
products. Fourth, the iterative multiple price list (iMPL) method is carefully explained to the participant
using an example. Fifth, the participant completes the experimental component of the survey comprising
six within-subject treatments (iMPL tasks). Sixth, for each of the six treatments the participant is asked
how likely it would be that they would actually exchange the one retirement benefit product for the other,
given their responses in the experimental task.
2.3.1 First stage: Information and information framing
The experimental task begins with the presentation of general information about the experimental com-
ponent of the survey and the tasks to be completed. Participants are informed that they will be presented
with information about two retirement benefit products and will be asked to complete a product knowl-
edge quiz for which they can earn additional monetary rewards. We include the incentivized product
knowledge quiz to encourage participants to learn about the products and their features to increase the
likelihood that they make informed decisions in the iMPL tasks. Participants are then randomly assigned
to one of four framing treatment groups and receive “framed” explanations of the general features of the
two retirement benefit products. The text of the general features of the two retirement benefit products
for the four frame treatments is presented in Table 3.
Framing in the context of annuitization has been considered in two dimensions, namely consumption
versus investment framing and gain versus loss framing (Agnew et al., 2008; Brown et al., 2008b; Bockweg
et al., 2018). The four framing treatments we consider are: consumption gain, consumption loss, invest-
ment gain and investment loss. When participants are allocated to a particular frame treatment, this
applies to both retirement benefit products. Relevant words are emphasized by presenting them in bold.
In the consumption frame the general product information informs the participant of the effect of the
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Table 3: Frames for general product features
Guaranteed Lifetime Income product Flexible Account product
Consumption Gain
This product provides guaranteed income for your
regular expenses for as long as you and your part-
ner live, even if you or your partner live longer than
expected. The more you buy of this product the
more you have for regular expenditures for the
rest of your life.
This product allows you to choose you and your part-
ners income level depending on your expenses. If
the account balance is sufficient you will be able to
pay for unexpected expenses while maintaining the
same standard of living. The more you buy of this
product the higher the flexibility you will have to
match your expenditures.
Consumption Loss
This product provides guaranteed income for your
regular expenses for as long as you and your partner
live, even if you need more for unexpected expenses.
The more you buy of this product the less flexibility
you have for unexpected expenses.
This product allows you to choose your income level
depending on you and your partner’s expenses. If
the account balance is insufficient you will not be able
to pay for unexpected expenses and you may not
be able to maintain your standard of living. The
more you buy of this product the lower your flexi-
bility to match expenses when your account balance
is insufficient.
Investment Gain
This product provides you with a guaranteed return
for as long as you live even if the financial markets
perform poorly. If you or your partner live long
then you get more than you paid for. The more
you buy of this product the higher the gain when
you live long.
This product allows you to choose your investment
portfolio. The more risk you’re willing to take,
the higher the expected return. Any remaining
account balance is inherited by your dependents or
estate when you and your partner die. The more
you buy of this product the higher your account
balance if financial markets perform well.
Investment Loss
This product doesn’t allow you to take any risk. If
the financial markets perform well the value of the
product will not increase. If you and your partner
die early then you get less than you paid for. The
more you buy of this product the more you lose
when you or your partner do not live long.
This product allows you to choose your investment
portfolio. The less risk you’re willing to take the
lower the expected return. Your account balance
might be insufficient if you or your partner live long.
The less you buy of this product the lower your
account balance if the financial markets perform
well.
products on possible expenditure patterns by emphasizing the words income, expenses and standard of
living. In this frame, the trade-off between the two products is having certainty about lifelong income ver-
sus having the flexibility to match income with (unexpected) expenditures. In the investment frame the
information provided informs the participant of the effect the products have on possible annual returns,
by emphasizing the words return, portfolio and account balance. In this frame, the trade-off is between
the possibility of earning an excess return versus hedging risk. This occurs in the financial market domain
as well as the mortality domain (e.g., outliving your money, setting aside bequests). A further difference
is that the investment frame includes information on whether the product enables bequests, which is not
included in the consumption frame. In the gain frame the general product information is presented in a
positive manner - that is, emphasizing the benefits or advantages of the product. On the contrary, in the
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loss frame the general product information is presented in a negative manner that is, emphasizing the 
downside of the products.
Following the provision of “framed” general product information, the participant is presented with 
information about the specific product features. As compared to the presentation of the general product 
features, which differs according to the framing treatment to which the participant is allocated, the specific 
product features are designed to be frame-neutral and are therefore the same for all participants (with only 
slight differences when the participant had a partner). For example, frame-neutral product features for the 
Lifetime Guaranteed Income product and the Flexible Account product are presented in Table 4 for 
participants who are part of a couple. For singles, “you and your partner” is replaced by “you” and the 
product feature “What happens if I or my partner dies?” is not presented.
Table 4: Product features
Lifetime guaranteed income prod-
uct
Flexible account product
How much income will I receive? You and your partner will receive
a regular income
You can choose how much to with-
draw each month
How long do payments last? Your regular income will be paid
for as long as you or your partner
live
You and your partner can continue
to withdraw as long as your ac-
count balance is positive
What happens if I or my partner
dies?
If one of you passes away, the sur-
viving spouse will receive the reg-
ular income. However, the income
will be reduced by one third (sim-
ilar to age pension)
If one of you passes away, any
remaining money in your account
will be left to the surviving spouse
What happens if I and my partner
die?
If both you and your partner have
passed away, there will be no inher-
itance for your dependents or your
estate
If both you and your partner have
passes away, the remaining money
in your account will be inherited by
your dependents or your estate
What happens if the prices of
things I buy increase?
Your regular income is automati-
cally adjusted to the price level
The amount you withdraw is not
automatically adjusted to the price
level. However, you can increase
the amount you withdraw when
the prices increase
What happens if there are fluctua-
tions in financial markets (such as
interest rates or share prices)?
Your regular income will be un-
changed
Your account balance will fluctuate
with financial markets
What happens if I live longer than
expected?
As long as you or your partner live,
you will receive a regular income
When you or your partner live long
you may run the risk of outliving
your account.
2.3.2 Second stage: Product knowledge quiz
Following presentation of general product information (by frame treatment) and the specific product
features (frame-neutral), participants complete a product knowledge quiz. Here the participant is asked
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to indicate which product features relates to which of the two retirement benefit products. The goal of
the product knowledge quiz is twofold. First, to incentivize participants to learn about the products,
to enable them to make informed choices in the experiment task. Second, to provide participants with
feedback on their performance (product knowledge) by providing the correct answers (to any incorrectly
answered questions) once they had submitted the answers. Providing feedback for incorrect answers gives
the participants another opportunity to learn about the product features. A screenshot of the product
knowledge quiz, including the feedback screen is presented in Figure 1.
Figure 1: Product knowledge quiz.
From Table 5 we observe that participants have on average four out of five questions correct, but only
44% (43% in the Netherlands and 45% in Australia) made no mistakes. The questions with most mistakes
concern whether the remaining wealth can be a bequest and whether the retirement benefit product is
subject to financial market risks. Slightly more Australian than Dutch participants did not know that the
Flexible Account product’s remaining account balance could be a bequest. However, surprisingly, slightly
more Dutch than Australians did not know that payments from the Guaranteed Lifetime Income product
do not depend on the financial market, despite lifetime annuities being the most prevalent (and often
only) type of retirement benefit. A possible explanation is the close link between benefit indexation and
the funding ratio of the fund in Dutch pension design, which ordinary people may mistakenly attribute
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to financial market performance.
Table 5: Product knowledge quiz
Percentage correct answers per question Total number of mistakes
Netherlands Australia Sample Netherlands Australia Sample
Q1 95.21% 92.40% 93.81% 0 42.87% 45.20% 44.03%
Q2 83.35% 85.10% 84.22% 1 25.12% 22.20% 23.66%
Q3 71.29% 65.50% 68.40% 2 17.25% 20.70% 18.96%
Q4 69.69% 70.50% 70.09% 3 13.46% 10.80% 12.13%
Q5 75.17% 86.10% 80.63% 4 1.20% 1.10% 1.15%
Average 78.94% 79.92% 79.48% 5 0.10% 0% 0.05%
The left panel of the table displays the percentage of participants who had, for each of the
questions displayed in Figure 1, the correct answer. The last row of the left panel corresponds
to the average of the five questions of the percentage of participants who had the correct
answer. The right panel displays the percentage of participants who had 0 to 5 mistakes in
the product knowledge quiz.
2.3.3 Third stage: Product perception
Following completion of the product knowledge quiz participants are asked about their perception of 
each retirement benefit product in terms of understanding of the product, riskiness of the product, and 
level of control that the product would allow. Responses were collected using a Likert scale with values 
between 0 and 10. These variables aim to measure the individual’s perceived ambiguity, risk and flexibility 
associated with each of the products and these questions are asked before the six iMPL tasks, to induce 
participants to further consider the features of the products before completing the choice tasks.
Table 6 reports responses to the 0-10 Likert scale. We observe that on average, participants in 
Australia and the Netherlands report a similar perceived understanding of the products. The Lifetime 
Guaranteed Income product is seen by both subsamples as a less risky product. More Dutch participants 
report a higher perceived risk for the Flexible Account product compared to the Lifetime Guaranteed In-
come product. This is expected given their unfamiliarity with the Flexible Account product. The Dutch 
participants self-report a slightly better understanding of the Guaranteed Lifetime Income product (life-
time annuity) than the Australian participants, which is consistent with previous studies which identified 
poor knowledge of seemingly standard benefit product features (Bateman et al., 2016a). Australian par-
ticipants respond that Flexible Account products give them much more control, in contrast to the Dutch 
participants. This is expected as Australians are familiar with Flexible Account products5, whereas the
5The account-based pension a type of flexible account product is the most popular type of retirement benefit product
(Bateman and Piggott, 2010).
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Table 6: Product perception
-10 to -6 -5 to -2 -1 0 1 2 to 5 6 to 10
Understanding NL 0.10% 1.10% 3.49% 68% 17.25% 9.17% 0.90%
Understanding AU 0% 2.20% 6.60% 76% 10.10% 4.80% 0.30%
Understanding 0.05% 1.65% 5.04% 71.99% 13.68% 6.99% 0.60%
Riskiness NL 0.40% 5.28% 5.38% 23.93% 6.08% 32.10% 26.82%
Riskiness AU 0.80% 5.10% 5.50% 26.80% 8.60% 35.50% 17.70%
Riskiness 0.60% 5.19% 5.44% 25.36% 7.34% 33.80% 22.27%
Control NL 15.45% 18.25% 6.48% 28.61% 8.37% 17.75% 5.08%
Control AU 23.50% 29.90% 7.40% 25.80% 5.70% 6.50% 1.20%
Control 19.47% 24.06% 6.94% 27.21% 7.04% 12.13% 2.15%
This table displays the difference in the response to the questions for the Lifetime Guaranteed
Income product and the Flexible Account product. A higher value implies that the Lifetime
Guaranteed Income product is perceived to have more favorable features than the Flexible
Account product. The top panel corresponds to the question: “How well do you think you
understand the features of ...?”. The middle panel corresponds to the question: “How risky
do you think the .... is?” The lower panel corresponds to the question: “How much control
do you think you have with the ...?” The first row of each panel includes the only Dutch
participants, the middle rows only Australian participants and the last rows both Dutch and
Australian participants.
Dutch are more familiar with lifetime pensions (a form of Lifetime Guaranteed Income product).
2.3.4 Fourth stage: iMPL task instructions
The aim of each iMPL task is to identify the switching point in preferences between two portfolios of
the two retirement benefit products - the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product and the Flexible Account
product (designated as “Option A” and “Option B”). Before participants proceed to the six iMPL tasks,
they are presented with an example of the iMPL method over a series of five screens.6 The first screen
provides an overview and on the following four screens the participant is taken through an example of the
iterative multiple price list choice task. To reduce the likelihood that the worked example would guide
participant decisions in the actual iMPL tasks, the example avoids monetary amounts which are similar
to those presented in any of the four income treatments. On the first screen of the example, the trade-off
between “Option A” and “Option B” for first row of the first stage of the interactive multiple price list
(iMPL) is explained. The second screen explains the trade-off for the last row and the third screen for
a row in the middle. The last screen (see Figure 2) provides information about stage two - the iterative
part of the iMPL task.
6The theoretical explanation of the iMPL task is provided in Section 2.1.
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Figure 2: Example.
2.3.5 Fifth stage: main experimental task
Following the worked example, participants proceed to the six iterative multiple price list (iMPL) tasks.
For each iMPL task, the general product features for the two retirement benefit products are presented at
the top of the screen, consistent with the framing treatment to which the participant has been allocated
(see Table 3). This ensures that participants are reminded of the “framed” product features as they
complete each task.
For each iMPL task, the participant is asked to indicate preferences for first five (stage one), then
four (stage two) alternative trade-offs between two portfolios of retirement benefit products (which can
be purchased with the wealth to which they have been allocated). That is, the participant is asked to
indicate whether he prefers the portfolio of retirement benefit products in Option A or the portfolio of
retirement benefit products in Option B. The portfolios comprise some amount in a Flexible Account
product and some amount as a Guaranteed Lifetime Income product. For a given iMPL task, Option A
has the same allocation to the retirement products in all the alternatives (the five alternatives in stage
one and the four alternatives in stage two). In Option B either the Lifetime Guaranteed income product
or the Flexible Account product has an increasing allocation (as one moves between alternatives in the
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multiple price list), whereas the value of the other product, whether it be the Flexible Account or the
Lifetime Guaranteed Income product), remains the same for all alternatives.
To assist participants with a given task, a simple retirement calculator appears under each choice set
showing the possible implications (of the product allocations) for the drawdown of the products. The
retirement calculator provides two possible draw down patterns, one for the combination of products in
Option A, and one for the combination of products in Option B. For Option B we display the possible draw
down pattern for the first alternative for which the participant prefers Option B over Option A. Note that
Option A has the same allocation to the two retirement benefit products in the five alternatives, so the
possible draw down pattern for Option A is the same for all the shown alternatives in a particular choice
task. The retirement calculator allows participants to adjust four assumptions relating to the product
features which could make the products attractive: 1) the last age at which the Flexible Account makes
a payment (where the range of possible values is between 80 and 110, in 5-year intervals, with a default
of 80 years); 2) the amount of money the participant prefers to set aside for unexpected expenditures or
bequests (where the participant can choose any value and the default is set at zero); 3) the option to have
a higher income in the first five years (either yes or no, with the default set at no); and 4) the expected
return in excess of the inflation rate for the Flexible Account product (where options range from 0% to
7%, with increments of 1%, and the default is set at 1%). The calculator defaults are set the first time the
calculator is used, however, in later iMPL tasks, the default settings are those values previously used by
a given participant (which may be the original or revised assumptions). We take this approach because,
for a given participant, assumptions should be consistent across iMPL tasks, and by doing so we reduce
required effort as the participant does not have to re-set his preferred assumptions for each task.
Between-subject treatment: Product endowment
Participants are allocated to one of two product endowment treatments: either a willingness to pay
(WTP) for additional lifetime income from the Guaranteed Lifetime Income product or willingness to
accept (WTA) a reduction in lifetime income from the Guaranteed Lifetime Income product. In the WTP
(WTA) treatment, the values of the Guaranteed Lifetime Income (Flexible Account) product in Option B
are increasing and higher than in Option A. Option B has a lower Flexible Account (Guaranteed Lifetime
Income) than in Option A. The implicit question for the participant in the WTP frame is -suppose you
have the portfolio in Option A- would you decrease your Lifetime Guaranteed Income by A$X to receive
an additional A$Y in your Flexible Account? The implicit question for the participant in the WTA
frame is -suppose you have the portfolio in Option A- would you reduce your Flexible Account by A$X
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to receive an additional A$Y Lifetime Guaranteed Income. The value of X depends on the question and
the value of Y increases with the alternatives in the list?
Within-subject treatments: Product allocation
In the experimental task, each participant is shown six different iMPL choice sets. For each of these six
choice sets we first constructed the benchmark options A and B with an allocation to the two retirement
benefit products. The next four alternatives in each choice set are based on composition of the benchmark
options. The benchmark portfolios in the six iMPL choice sets vary by the proportion of annuitized
retirement wealth in addition to state pension. This retirement wealth which can be used to supplement
the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product or be incorporated into the Flexible Account product. This is
calculated by the difference between the retirement income, as given in Table 2, and the level of state
pension. The state pension income level for couples is set by taking the average of e20,000 and A$35,000.
For singles it is two-thirds of that amount.
Since there are six choice sets, there are six benchmark portfolios with levels of annuitization as
follows: 100% annuitization for Option A and 2/3 annuitization for Option B; 100% for Option A and
1/3 for Option B; 100% for Option A and 0% for Option B; 2/3 for Option A and 1/3 for Option B;
2/3 for Option A and 0% for Option B; and 1/3 for Option A and 0% for Option B. The fraction of
retirement savings which is not annuitized is converted into the Flexible Account using an annuity factor
of 23.00 for couples and 17.38 for singles.7 The order of the six within-subject treatments (choice sets) is
randomized to prevent order effects driving the results as participants progress through the treatments.
Alternatives in the task
Whereas the WTP frame shows increasing iMPL values for Option Bs Guaranteed Lifetime Income
product, the WTA frame has increasing values in Option As Flexible Account product. The level of
variation depends on the benchmark portfolio and set multiplication factors. For the WTP (WTA)
treatment, the alternative values for Option B (Option A) are set by multiplying the difference between
the benchmark Guaranteed Lifetime Income (Flexible Account) in Option A (Option B) and adding that
to the Guaranteed Lifetime Income (Flexible Account) of Option B (Option A). For the first round of
the iMPL the multiples are 0.5, 0.707, 1, 1.414, and 2 (see first column of Table 7). Thereafter, in the
second round, depending on the choice in the first round, the participant is shown four alternatives. The
increments are chosen such that they are log-linear (see columns 3-6 of Table 7).
The alternative at which the participant switches in the second round is used to determine the price
7The annuity factors were calculated as the net present value of an income stream with a duration of 26 (for couples) or
19 (for singles) years and an interest rate of 1%.
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Table 7: Money’s worth ratio in the various alternatives
First round Second round
Always choose Option A: 0.351 0.388 0.429 0.475
0.500 Switch to Option B in first row: 0.522 0.569 0.621 0.677
0.707 Switch to Option B in second row: 0.738 0.805 0.878 0.958
1.000 Switch to Option B in third row: 1.044 1.139 1.242 1.354
1.414 Switch to Option B in fourth row: 1.477 1.610 1.756 1.915
2.000 Always choose Option B: 2.104 2.328 2.577 2.852
This table displays the money’s worth ratio used for setting the alternatives in the task for the
WTP treatment. For the WTA treatment the inverse of the numbers is used. The money’s
worth ratio is the actuarially fair price of the income stream divided by the price of the
Lifetime Guaranteed Income product. A number smaller (larger) than one implies that the
annuity is more (less) expensive than the actuarially fair price.
they are willing to pay for an annuity. This includes always choosing Option A, to which we assign the
value 1/3. In case of the WTA (WTP) treatment the price of the annuity for which the participant is
willing to buy is equal to the price of the annuity multiplied by (the inverse of) the midpoint of the values
in Table 7 corresponding to the rows where the participant switches. For the WTA frame the values in
Table 7 can thus be interpreted as the multiple of a fair price, whereas for the WTP treatment it would
be the inverse of the values in the table.
2.3.6 Sixth stage: Likelihood to act
One of the disadvantages of using the MPL format is that hypothetical experimental responses might
be prone to substantially overestimate WTP (see, for example Cummings et al., 1997).8 Blumenschein
et al. (2008) found that assessing the degree of certainty of the hypothetical responses with Choice
Contingent Valuation (see, e.g. Champ et al., 1997 using a ten-point scale, Johannesson et al., 1998 using
a dichotomous choice) is effective in mitigating hypothetical bias. Therefore, following the six choice
sets we ask participants for each of the six choices “how likely is it that you would reduce your Lifetime
Guaranteed Income by $X to receive an additional $Y (the reported amount) in your Flexible Account?”
and in the WTA frame “how likely is it that you would use $X from your Flexible Account to buy an
additional Guaranteed Lifetime Income of $Y (the reported amount)?” The responses are collected on a
Likert scale with values between 0 and 10. Each of the six questions starts with “Suppose you have $A
in your Flexible Account and a Lifetime Guaranteed income of $B”. To prevent cognitive exhaustion, all
six questions are displayed on one screen, in the non-randomized order described in Section 2.3.5.
8This is not found in all studies, for example, Carson et al. (1996) suggest that values from hypothetical choice and
revealed preference studies match fairly well.
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2.4 Covariates
After completing the experimental task, participants are asked questions about planning and their per-
sonality traits, pension arrangements and financial competence, and demographics and personal charac-
teristics. These variables are collected for two purposes. First, we are interested in whether they could
explain any heterogeneity of participant’s valuation of the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product (that is,
the annuity). Second, once we correct for the main heterogeneity in the collected variables, the remaining
country differences in valuation of the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product would be due to differences
in social norms and institutional settings between the Netherlands and Australia.
Financial capabilities
We collect three variables related to financial capabilities. First, the variable SA fin lit is a self-assessed
financial literacy measure elicited using a Likert scale from 1 to 7 where 1 means a “very low” and 7
means a “very high” understanding of finance. Second, the variable Fin lit is the number of correct
answers to the three standard financial literacy questions from Lusardi and Mitchell (2011), while the
variable Numeracy is the number of correct answers to the three numeracy questions from Lipkus et al.
(2001).
Retirement income replacement rate
Three variables are collected to measure household wealth. First, the variable Household Income is
a categorical variable representing the four categories of income, see Table 2. Second, the variable
Homeowner is an indicator variable for whether the participant is a homeowner or not. Being homeowner
can been seen as providing an income from the imputed rent. Third, the variable Wealth, which is
household wealth excluding owner-occupied housing wealth and retirement savings. This is a categorical
variable with four outcomes: less than $0 in Australia (less than e0 in the Netherlands), between $0 and
$34,999 (between e0 and e19,999), between $35,000 and $104,999 (between e20,000 and e59,999) and
more than $105,000 (more than e60,000).
Health & life expectancy
We collect three variables related to the health and longevity of the participant. First, Health is an
indicator variable which equals one if the self-assessed health is either “very good” or “excellent” and zero
if “poor”, “moderate” or “good”. Second, the variable SLE-OLE is the difference in years between the
participant’s subjective life expectancy elicited in the survey and the objective life expectancy (from either
the Australian Bureau of Statistics or Statistics Netherlands). The objective life expectancy includes
further forecast improvements in life expectancy and is provided to participants as part of the subjective
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life expectancy question. Third, the variable Outlive partner is elicited using a Likert scale from 0 to
10 for the question “how likely do you think you will outlive your spouse or partner”, where “0” is very
unlikely and “10” is very likely.
Saving & planning
We include six variables designed to measure savings habits and financial planning. The first variable is
Savings habit which is the average of twelve questions from Loibl et al. (2011) answered using a Likert
scale from 1 to 7. The second variable is Spending horizon which is an indicator variable which equals
one if the most important time horizon for planning expenditures and savings is not more than the
next couple of months and zero otherwise. The third variable is Future time which is the average of six
questions from Jacobs-Lawson and Hershey (2005) answered using a Likert scale from 1 to 7 where a
higher number indicates that the participant is more forward looking. The fourth variable is Fin plan
which is an indicator variable for whether the participant has ever tried to work out how much they
need to save for retirement. The fifth variable is SA planning knowledge which is the average of six
questions related to retirement planning from Jacobs-Lawson and Hershey (2005). The sixth variable is
SA retirement distance which is a variable measuring whether retirement will occur for the participant
in the near future or in the distant future, with answers on a Likert scale from 1 to 7.
Personality traits
We include three covariates relating to psychological personality traits. In the survey we collect the ten
item TIPI questions from Gosling et al. (2003), providing us the big 5 personality traits. In addition, we
collect the conscientiousness measure used in Agnew et al. (2013) and Agnew et al. (2016). The covariates
are then standardized.9
We combine the standardized conscientiousness measure from Gosling et al. (2003) and Agnew et al.
(2013) and construct the covariate Conscientiousness which equals one if the participant has a higher
than the median score on this measure. We construct the Extrovert/Open covariate which equals one if
the participant scores higher than the median on the combined standardized extroversion and standard-
ized openness to new ideas measure from Gosling et al. (2003). We construct the Agreeable/Emotional
covariate which equals one if the participant scores higher than the median on the combined standardized
agreeable and standardized emotional measure from Gosling et al. (2003).
We also include two variables for the economic utility parameters. First, the variable Risk is derived
9We also collected the impulsiveness measure used in Tsukayama et al. (2012). To reduce the number of covariates, we
performed a factor analysis on the seven variables, which signals that there are 3 factors. We therefore construct three
covariates, where each of the constructed covariates are constructed by selecting the standardized personality measures with
the two highest (in absolute values) factor loadings.
21
from the Dohman et al. (2011) question “How do you see yourself: Are you generally a person who is
fully prepared to take risks in financial matters or do you try to avoid taking risks in financial matters?”.
The question is answered using a Likert scale from 0 (not prepared to take risks) to 10 (fully prepared
to take risks). Second, the variable Patience is elicited using a question from Becker et al. (2012) asking
“How do you see yourself: Are you generally an impatient person or someone who always shows great
patience?”. The question is answered using a Likert scale from 0 (very impatient) to 10 (very patient).
Demographic characteristics
We collect several personal characteristics variables as follows. The variable Age is the age of the partic-
ipant in years. The variable Female is an indicator variable for whether the participant is female or not,
the variable Single is an indicator variable of whether the participant is single or not, and the variable
Children is an indicator variable of whether the participant has children or not. The variable Bachelor’s
degree is an indicator variable which equals one if the respondent had at least a bachelor degree and zero
otherwise. The variable In labor force is an indicator variable for whether the participant is working
-either part-time or full-time- and the variable Self-employed is an indicator of whether the participant
is self-employed or not.
Representativeness of the sample
Table 8 compares the country sub-samples with population characteristics from Statistics Netherlands
and the Australian Bureau of Statistics Census data. Apart from being slightly more often in the labor
force and slightly more educated than the population, the sample is representative. This is due to the
constraint in the experimental survey that at least one member of the household should be in the labor
force in order to be eligible to participate in the experimental survey.
Table 8: Representativeness of the sample
Population Sample
NL AU NL AU
Female 49.93% 51.13% 44.97% 50.00%
Single 33.92% 29.48% 31.80% 31.10%
Bachelor’s degree 31.07% 29.03% 40.28% 33.50%
In labor force 68.19% 73.11% 75.45% 77.60%
Self-employed 17.11% 14.05% 13.06% 14.00%
This table displays the representativeness of the sample for the main personal characteristics.
Columns (1) and (2) are population fractions. These population fractions are based on na-
tional representative figures from statistics Netherlands and the 2016 Australian Census for
50-65 year old. Columns (3) and (4) are the experimental survey sample fractions.
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3 Results - perceived product features
The attractiveness of the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product and the Flexible Account product should 
be mainly driven by whether the participant values the guarantees in the former or the freedom of choice 
in the latter. Moreover, if the participant perceives that he does not understand the product features 
he would be less inclined to prefer that product. Therefore, in this section we investigate what 
explains participants perception of the products. As described in Section 2.3.3, we ask each 
participant three questions for both products to elicit their perceived understanding of the product, their 
perception of the riskiness of the product and the control they perceive to have with the product.
The descriptive statistics reported in Table 7 show that there is some dispersity in the relative differ-
ence in perceived product features. To understand the effect the covariates have on the attractiveness of 
the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product (relative to the Flexible Account product) we first investigate 
their effect on the perceived product features. For each of the three product features we perform a linear 
regression on the difference between the reported values of the Likert scale of the two products. The pa-
rameter estimates are presented in Table 9, with regressions on the whole sample (columns (3), (6), and 
(9)) and on the Dutch (columns (1), (4), and (7)) and Australian (columns (2), (5), and (8)) subsamples 
separately. The latter is to observe whether institutional settings and social norms -which are country 
specific- might affect the association of the covariates with the perceived product feature.
In the regression we also include covariates specific to our experimental design. The covariate Quiz 
mistakes is an indicator variable which equals one if the participant made at least three mistakes in 
the product knowledge quiz. The covariate Short time is an indicator variable which equals one if the 
participant was among the 10% of participants who spent the least time on the survey. At the end of the 
survey we asked, “How clear do you think the questions in this survey are”. If the participant reported 
either “Sometimes clear”, “mostly confusing” or “completely confusing” our indicator variable Confusing 
equals one and zero otherwise.
To investigate the effect of an participant’s engagement with the experimental survey, we define 
a participant as having a low engagement when either the indicator Quiz mistakes or the indicator 
Short time is equal to one. We interact this low engagement indicator with various covariates, which is 
represented by the variable name ending with LOW.10
The covariate Consumption framing is an indicator variable which equals one for the information
10The indicator LOW is a linear combination of the variables Quiz mistakes, Short time and Short time x Quiz mistakes.
Therefore, our specification includes the main effects of the variables with interaction effects.
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Table 9: Regression estimates for product characteristics regressions
Understanding Riskiness Control
NL AU sample NL AU sample NL AU sample
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Institutional settings
Australian −0.174 ∗ ∗∗ −0.621 ∗ ∗∗ −1.921 ∗ ∗∗
(−2.97) (−3.37) (−8.79)
Australian LOW −0.160 0.738 ∗ ∗ 1.502 ∗ ∗∗
(−1.09) (2.51) (5.01)
Information framing
Gain framing 0.153 ∗ ∗ −0.0272 0.0649 0.603 ∗ ∗∗ 0.0219 0.322 ∗ ∗ −0.531∗ 0.0573 −0.188
(2.10) (−0.41) (1.31) (2.69) (0.10) (2.02) (−1.75) (0.23) (−0.95)
Consumption framing −0.0501 0.0335 0.0000306 −0.536 ∗ ∗ 0.0153 −0.252 0.501 0.0421 0.267
(−0.68) (0.53) (0.00) (−2.37) (0.07) (−1.57) (1.63) (0.17) (1.35)
Gain framing LOW −0.685 ∗ ∗∗ 0.0996 −0.296 ∗ ∗ −0.417 −0.0119 −0.216 0.347 −0.347 −0.0618
(−2.98) (0.62) (−2.13) (−0.94) (−0.03) (−0.78) (0.79) (−0.91) (−0.21)
Consumption framing LOW 0.325 −0.123 0.0995 −0.0945 −0.0742 −0.0137 −0.464 −0.131 −0.348
(1.34) (−0.76) (0.69) (−0.22) (−0.20) (−0.05) (−1.06) (−0.34) (−1.21)
Financial capabilities
SA fin lit −0.00703 −0.0796 ∗ ∗ −0.0455∗ −0.0791 −0.130 −0.115 0.0395 0.163 0.0920
(−0.17) (−2.32) (−1.69) (−0.65) (−1.09) (−1.37) (0.24) (1.24) (0.91)
Fin lit −0.0335 −0.0203 −0.0336 0.687 ∗ ∗∗ 0.435 ∗ ∗∗ 0.561 ∗ ∗∗ −0.398∗ −0.604 ∗ ∗∗ −0.497 ∗ ∗∗
(−0.53) (−0.43) (−0.85) (4.38) (2.65) (4.97) (−1.82) (−3.31) (−3.49)
Numeracy −0.0561 0.0137 −0.0183 0.345 ∗ ∗∗ 0.401 ∗ ∗∗ 0.385 ∗ ∗∗ −0.644 ∗ ∗∗ −0.499 ∗ ∗∗ −0.554 ∗ ∗∗
(−1.19) (0.40) (−0.62) (2.64) (3.21) (4.27) (−3.98) (−3.68) (−5.20)
SA fin lit LOW −0.0410 0.0468 0.00446 0.291∗ 0.273∗ 0.258 ∗ ∗ −0.280 −0.147 −0.270 ∗ ∗
(−0.47) (0.91) (0.09) (1.66) (1.91) (2.35) (−1.49) (−1.00) (−2.34)
Fin lit LOW 0.138 0.0238 0.0971 −0.429∗ −0.204 −0.309∗ 0.728 ∗ ∗∗ 0.197 0.468 ∗ ∗
(1.13) (0.25) (1.27) (−1.74) (−0.83) (−1.79) (2.71) (0.77) (2.55)
Numeracy LOW 0.147 −0.0353 0.0319 −0.0747 0.0227 −0.0245 0.303 0.487 ∗ ∗ 0.374 ∗ ∗
(1.27) (−0.39) (0.43) (−0.30) (0.10) (−0.14) (1.26) (2.10) (2.22)
Experimental design
Quiz mistakes 0.179 −0.126 0.0947 −1.613∗ −2.046 ∗ ∗∗ −2.149 ∗ ∗∗ 0.170 2.083 ∗ ∗∗ 0.630
(0.37) (−0.43) (0.32) (−1.75) (−2.73) (−3.57) (0.16) (2.65) (0.95)
Short time −0.0475 −0.500 −0.257 −1.761∗ −1.880 ∗ ∗ −2.150 ∗ ∗∗ 0.327 1.434∗ 0.358
(−0.10) (−1.55) (−0.84) (−1.81) (−2.44) (−3.25) (0.31) (1.75) (0.52)
Short time x Quiz mistakes −0.215 0.445 0.0962 1.051 1.933 ∗ ∗ 1.857 ∗ ∗∗ −0.167 −1.275 −0.264
(−0.40) (1.18) (0.28) (0.97) (2.41) (2.66) (−0.15) (−1.56) (−0.37)
Confusing 0.0747 0.0189 0.0341 −0.425 −0.168 −0.310∗ 0.0554 0.793 ∗ ∗∗ 0.488 ∗ ∗
(0.63) (0.19) (0.44) (−1.59) (−0.71) (−1.76) (0.18) (2.86) (2.37)
Retirement income replacement rate
Household income 0.0359 0.0486 0.0628 ∗ ∗ 0.454 ∗ ∗∗ 0.167 0.309 ∗ ∗∗ 0.317∗ −0.137 0.0223
(0.78) (1.19) (2.01) (3.07) (1.59) (3.67) (1.77) (−1.18) (0.23)
Homeowner −0.0746 −0.216 ∗ ∗ −0.133∗ 0.430∗ −0.0798 0.236 −0.403 0.221 0.0112
(−0.69) (−2.34) (−1.89) (1.78) (−0.31) (1.35) (−1.29) (0.78) (0.05)
Wealth 0.0302 −0.00224 0.00500 −0.234∗ −0.209∗ −0.219 ∗ ∗∗ 0.131 0.0494 0.108
(0.63) (−0.07) (0.19) (−1.80) (−1.89) (−2.63) (0.74) (0.42) (1.09)
Health & life expectancy
Health 0.197∗ 0.153∗ 0.154 ∗ ∗ −0.0982 0.0378 −0.0630 −0.0577 −0.222 −0.185
(1.83) (1.71) (2.31) (−0.37) (0.17) (−0.37) (−0.17) (−0.89) (−0.89)
SLE-OLE −0.00129 −0.00270 −0.00217 0.0199 0.0118 0.0166 ∗ ∗ −0.0167 −0.0113 −0.0156∗
(−0.30) (−0.67) (−0.75) (1.59) (1.07) (2.01) (−1.17) (−0.92) (−1.68)
Outlive partner 0.0132 −0.00229 0.00265 −0.00633 −0.0421 −0.0266 0.0933 0.0770 0.0911 ∗ ∗
(0.81) (−0.17) (0.26) (−0.12) (−0.94) (−0.78) (1.47) (1.61) (2.35)
Saving & planning
Savings habit −0.0227 −0.0287 −0.0282∗ −0.0774 −0.0201 −0.0622 0.0221 −0.0772 −0.0343
(−0.89) (−1.32) (−1.68) (−0.98) (−0.26) (−1.14) (0.22) (−0.83) (−0.51)
Spending horizon −0.0842 −0.0308 −0.0603 −0.143 0.382∗ 0.178 −0.450 −0.0612 −0.151
(−0.93) (−0.51) (−1.14) (−0.53) (1.77) (1.06) (−1.39) (−0.26) (−0.79)
Future time 0.0288 0.0511 0.0351 0.00333 −0.0433 −0.0231 0.0470 −0.0734 −0.0196
(0.61) (1.38) (1.15) (0.03) (−0.36) (−0.28) (0.30) (−0.57) (−0.20)
Fin plan −0.0897 −0.0310 −0.0842 −0.183 −0.170 −0.221 0.497∗ −0.120 0.127
(−1.05) (−0.37) (−1.43) (−0.85) (−0.74) (−1.42) (1.76) (−0.46) (0.67)
SA planning knowledge 0.0401 0.0790 ∗ ∗ 0.0630 ∗ ∗ 0.0817 0.00738 0.0696 −0.00431 −0.110 −0.0300
(1.03) (1.97) (2.22) (0.84) (0.07) (0.96) (−0.03) (−0.90) (−0.34)
SA retirement distant −0.0192 0.000673 −0.00875 0.00828 0.00331 0.0116 −0.0237 0.0417 0.0301
(−0.78) (0.03) (−0.52) (0.12) (0.05) (0.25) (−0.27) (0.57) (0.54)
Personality Traits
Conscientiousness 0.0578 −0.133 ∗ ∗ −0.0412 0.430 ∗ ∗ −0.0827 0.188 0.106 −0.322 −0.114
(0.72) (−2.00) (−0.79) (2.04) (−0.39) (1.27) (0.38) (−1.39) (−0.63)
Extrovert/Open 0.0400 −0.0257 0.0157 0.193 0.169 0.191 0.0782 0.176 0.132
(0.51) (−0.40) (0.31) (0.93) (0.85) (1.34) (0.29) (0.79) (0.76)
Agreeable/Emotional −0.0144 0.00876 0.00758 0.252 0.486 ∗ ∗ 0.394 ∗ ∗∗ −0.464∗ −0.0444 −0.252
(−0.19) (0.13) (0.15) (1.20) (2.15) (2.59) (−1.71) (−0.18) (−1.40)
Risk −0.0440 ∗ ∗ −0.0404 ∗ ∗ −0.0415 ∗ ∗∗ −0.185 ∗ ∗∗ −0.0768 −0.131 ∗ ∗∗ −0.0976 −0.0558 −0.0856 ∗ ∗
(−2.08) (−2.46) (−3.09) (−3.96) (−1.61) (−4.05) (−1.62) (−1.11) (−2.23)
Patience 0.0150 −0.00861 0.00204 0.0199 0.0172 0.0143 −0.0544 0.0205 −0.0137
(0.96) (−0.53) (0.18) (0.38) (0.35) (0.40) (−0.82) (0.40) (−0.33)
Demographic
Age 0.0138 −0.0118 0.00144 0.0221 −0.0197 0.00184 0.00714 0.00741 0.00618
(1.28) (−1.56) (0.22) (0.81) (−0.79) (0.10) (0.21) (0.26) (0.29)
Female −0.0979 −0.158 ∗ ∗ −0.124 ∗ ∗ 0.250 0.146 0.214 −0.148 −0.414∗ −0.307
(−1.00) (−2.09) (−2.03) (1.01) (0.67) (1.33) (−0.49) (−1.74) (−1.63)
Single 0.206 0.0814 0.124 0.509 −0.00618 0.224 −0.0548 0.235 0.120
(1.59) (0.67) (1.43) (1.41) (−0.02) (0.90) (−0.12) (0.66) (0.41)
Children −0.0409 −0.0657 −0.0900∗ −0.134 −0.0720 −0.173 −0.0945 −0.255 −0.180
(−0.53) (−0.88) (−1.68) (−0.62) (−0.31) (−1.12) (−0.34) (−1.05) (−0.99)
Bachelor’s degree 0.0815 −0.0550 0.00678 0.443 ∗ ∗ 0.404∗ 0.406 ∗ ∗∗ −0.713 ∗ ∗ −0.197 −0.449 ∗ ∗
(1.05) (−0.82) (0.14) (2.01) (1.83) (2.67) (−2.39) (−0.82) (−2.35)
In labor force −0.205∗ −0.0665 −0.133∗ −0.428∗ 0.0811 −0.151 0.282 −0.0913 0.102
(−1.96) (−0.69) (−1.86) (−1.68) (0.32) (−0.84) (0.87) (−0.32) (0.47)
Self-employed −0.0949 0.0649 −0.0291 0.428 0.231 0.280 −0.223 −0.00804 −0.137
(−0.79) (0.78) (−0.42) (1.37) (0.79) (1.33) (−0.52) (−0.03) (−0.52)
Constant −0.342 1.298 ∗ ∗∗ 0.590 −0.352 2.864∗ 1.529 0.210 −0.497 0.709
(−0.45) (2.63) (1.36) (−0.20) (1.70) (1.27) (0.09) (−0.26) (0.49)
N 1, 003 1, 000 2, 003 1, 003 1, 000 2, 003 1, 003 1, 000 2, 003
Dependent variable for (1)-(3): Likert scale of understanding LGI product less FA product.
Dependent variable for (4)-(6): Likert scale of riskiness FA product less LGI product.
Dependent variable for (7)-(9): Likert scale of control LGI product less FA product.
t statistics in parentheses; * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.0124
framing treatments Consumption Gain and Consumption Loss (see Table 3 for the description of the
frames), while the covariate Gain framing is an indicator variable which equals one for the information
framing treatments Consumption Gain and Investment Gain.
We now discuss regression results distinguishing between behavioral influences (information framing,
institutional settings and financial capabilities), those influences informed by economic theory, and other
factors.
3.1 Perceived product features: main behavioral factors
Institutional settings
Importantly, the institutional design of the retirement income system remains an influence in the percep-
tion of the products. Participants perceive as more favourable the product with which they are familiar
from their real world retirement benefit arrangements. That Dutch participants are less familiar with
drawdown products and more familiar with annuity products, while Australian participants are less famil-
iar with annuity products and more familiar with drawdown products, shows up as significant parameter
Australian in the regression.
However, for participants who were less engaged with the experimental task, the institutional effects
on the perceived riskiness and control of the products are small.11 We intentionally did not use familiar
product names (annuity for the Dutch or account-based pension for Australians) in the experimental
task to address participants attributing features and perceptions from their real world experience with
similar products. As a result, the participants with low engagement have likely been less able to link the
experimental product features to the real world retirement income system and therefore the institutional
setting had little effect for the less engaged participants.
Information framing
As all the information frames are designed to present the same information, the information framing
covariates are expected to have no effect.12 Indeed, for the Australian subsample (columns (2), (5) and
(8)) we do not observe any significant effect of these covariates on the difference in understanding of the
two products. However, for the Dutch subsample (columns (1), (4) and (7)) we find that information
framing does play a role, but the role depends on whether the participant is engaged with the experimental
task or not. Where the Dutch participant is engaged, the loss frame will lead to better understanding
11The effect of less engaged Australians compared to less engaged Dutch participants is the sum of the parameter estimates
of the main effect (Australian) and interaction effect (Australian LOW ).
12Although, as noted earlier, the framing literature is mixed in the retirement benefits context.
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of the product they are not familiar with -the Flexible Account product- as the higher cost of loss will
enhance their effort. As a result, they are more aware that the Flexible Account product is more risky,
but provides greater control for unexpected expenses in the near future than the Guaranteed Lifetime
Income product. For the less engaged participant, however, the information in the loss frame is harder to
understand than in the gain frame and the participant is less likely to spend the effort to learn about it.
As a result, the less engaged Dutch participant learns less from the loss frame presentation and is therefore
more likely to understand the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product than the Flexible Account product
in this frame. As a consequence of limited information acquisition by the less engaged participants, the
effect of gain versus loss framing is limited for those participants.
For a Dutch participant, the consumption frame as opposed to the investment frame, leads to a
higher perceived riskiness of the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product compared to the Flexible Account
product. This is likely because the consumption frame also highlights consumption in the event of
unexpected expenditures, which would require precautionary savings.
Financial capabilities
The parameter estimates SA fin lit in the Australian subsample suggest that Australians who might think
they know enough and have therefore not spent enough time learning about the Lifetime Guaranteed
Income product have less understanding of the unfamiliar product. This effect is only present in the
Australian subsample. Participants with high self-reported financial literacy are more likely to consider
themselves capable of understanding products which are influenced by financial markets.
Participants who are better able to understand the guarantee features of the Guaranteed Lifetime
Income product are more likely to find the product less risky. We observe that engaged participants who
perform better in the financial literacy and numeracy questions perceive the Lifetime Guaranteed Income
product to be less risky, but that means less control of their spending.13 For the less engaged participants,
this effect is not present as their limited engagement with the experimental survey has limited their ability
to fully understand the guarantee features of the Guaranteed Lifetime Income product. Therefore, the
parameter estimates of the variables Fin lit LOW and Numeracy LOW are of similar magnitude, but of
the opposite sign to the variables Fin lit and Numeracy.
13Note that another way to interpret the results is that those who are less able to understand the products are more likely
to provide similar answers to the product features of the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product and the Flexible Account
product.
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3.2 Perceived product features: main rational (economic) factors
Retirement income replacement rate
Participants who would require a higher income replacement rate from their retirement savings -given pre-
annuitized state pension wealth- do perceive the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product as more favourable
relative to the Flexible Account product than participants who already have substantial income replace-
ment given the existing state pension income. Hence, the variable Household income tends to be positive,
whereas the variable Homeowner tends to be negative, as owning a home provides an imputed income
equal to the rental costs of the home.
Participants who have more wealth see the Flexible Account product relative to the Lifetime Guar-
anteed Income product as less risky than those who have less wealth. As wealthier participants are
more likely to have benefited from investment returns, this result might be driven by a selection effect.
Participants who view the stock market as less risky have invested in it and have accumulated larger
wealth, whereas participants who view the stock market as risky would not have invested in it and have
experienced lower financial returns. Naturally the former group would consider the exposure to the stock
market in the Flexible Account product as less risky than the latter group.
Health and life expectancy: the money’s worth
Participants who are in good Health could expect to live long and have a higher need for income products
and therefore know more about the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product. The longer the participant
expects to live (higher value of SLE-OLE ), the more risk he faces of running out of money before passing
away. Therefore he would find the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product less risky compared to the
Flexible Account product than those who expect to pass away soon. Given the joint and last survivor
feature of the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product, having a higher probability of outliving your partner
enhances the control of the product as it implies that the last survivor still receives an income.14 However,
as the income is reduced after the death of one member of the household, expecting to live longer reduces
the perception of control for the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product.
3.3 Perceived product features: other factors
Many of the parameter estimates related to personal characteristics, both the variables related to saving &
planning and personality traits, are not significant for the perception of the products at a 5% significance
14This is particularly the case as it is a decision for the household retirement wealth of both partners. Whereas females
are more likely to be the last survivors, they typically have less personal retirement wealth than their partner.
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level.
Those who have thought more about financing retirement -in Australia through a higher score on
SA planning knowledge- have greater understanding of the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product, likely
because they would be more familiar with the state pension, which has similar features to the Lifetime
Guaranteed Income product in our experiment.
Relatedly, Australians with a higher score for conscientiousness have a higher perceived understanding
of the Flexible Account product, as one would expect that they have made effort in the real world to
understand the product most associated with Australia’s institutional framework. However, the Dutch
with a higher score for conscientiousness, perceive the Flexible Account product relative to the Lifetime
Guaranteed Income product as more risky, possibly because they are not familiar with the Flexible
Account product. In addition, participants (particularly the Australian sub-sample) who score high for
the psychological trait Agreeable/Emotional perceive the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product as less
risky. This is not surprising as one would expect that they prefer the guarantee features of this product
relative to the uncertainty associated with a Flexible Account product.
Finally, the negative parameter estimates of Risk indicates that participants who are more willing to
take financial risk perceive the product features of the Flexible Account as more favourable compared to
the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product than participants less willing to take financial risks.
Many of the parameter estimates related to demographics are not significant for the perception of
the products at a 5% significance level. An exception is the covariate Female, which is negative and
significant possibly indicating that women in this age cohort (50-64) have thought less about how to
finance retirement due to modest account balances or pension rights.15
In line with the findings for financial capabilities, being better able to understand the product features
does not have a significant influence on the perceived understanding of the Lifetime Guaranteed Income
product relative to the Flexible Account product. This finding holds for financial capabilities (variables
Fin Lit and Numeracy), level of education of the participant (variable Bachelor’s degree) and effort
(variables Quiz mistakes and Short time).16
Similarly consistent is the result that better understanding of product features leads to perception that
the Flexible Account product is more risky, but provides less control relative to the Lifetime Guaranteed
15For example, in Australia the median pension account balance for a women aged 60-64 is A$36,000 (ASFA, 2017).
16Note that the opposite sign but of smaller magnitude of the interaction term Short time x Quiz mistakes than its main
effects implies that the effect of participants who had three or more mistakes in the product knowledge quiz and were within
the 10% fastest completions of the experimental survey is larger than the effect of participants where only one of those two
conditions held, but that the effect is not additive.
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Income product. This indicates that those who better understand the product features indeed are more
likely to perceive the insurance feature against outliving one’s wealth of the Lifetime Guaranteed Income
product at the expense of giving up some flexibility.17
4 Results - valuing annuities relative to drawdown products
In this section we analyze the drivers that explain the heterogeneity in valuing annuities (our Lifetime
Guaranteed Income product) relative to drawdown products (our Flexible Account product). As discussed
earlier we collected data on 2,003 participants who provided answers to the six within-subject treatments
(that is the six iMPL tasks which differ by their benchmark portfolio of retirement benefit allocations for
Option A and Option B).
Table 10 displays the average of the logged money’s worth ratio as displayed in Table 7 for various
subsamples. The averages (times 100%) can therefore be interpreted as the required percentage increase
in the price needed for the participant to be willing to purchase the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product.
17Again, note that another way to interpret these results is that those who are less able to understand the products are
more likely to provide similar answers to the product features of the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product and the Flexible
Account product.
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Table 10: Summary statistics for key results
Full Sample LOW engagement Engaged
sample 1st 2nd 1st 2nd 1st 2nd
AU vs NL -0.003 -0.017* 0.011 0.031 -0.021 -0.029*** 0.019*
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.021) (0.021) (0.010) (0.010)
Female vs male -0.003 -0.020** 0.013 -0.015 0.021 -0.021** 0.010
(0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.023) (0.019) (0.010) (0.010)
Single vs couple -0.003 0.086*** -0.044*** 0.065** -0.026 0.092*** -0.048***
(0.006) (0.012) (0.008) (0.026) (0.018) (0.013) (0.008)
WTP vs WTA -0.003 -0.088*** 0.082*** -0.144*** 0.163*** -0.074*** 0.063***
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.020) (0.021) (0.010) (0.010)
Gain vs Loss -0.003 0.013 -0.019** 0.071*** -0.056*** -0.000 -0.010
frame (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.021) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010)
Cons vs Invest -0.003 0.004 -0.010 -0.021 0.028 0.010 -0.021**
frame (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.022) (0.020) (0.010) (0.010)
Confused vs not -0.003 -0.087*** 0.013* -0.033 0.018 -0.111*** 0.012
(0.006) (0.016) (0.007) (0.030) (0.017) (0.019) (0.008)
Observations 12,018 12,018 2,394 9,624
Notes: This table displays the average of the logged money’s worth of annuities for various
subpopulations. In the even columns (1th) the subpopulation has the first characteristic of
the row (e.g. Australians, Females), whereas the odd columns (2nd) the subpopulation has
the second characteristic of the row (e.g. Netherlands, Male).
The first three columns the averages are taken for the specific subpopulation of the whole
sample, in the next two columns only of the sample with LOW engagement, and in the last
two columns of the sample without the participants with LOW engagement.
Standard errors in parentheses; * p< 0.10, ** p< 0.05, *** p< 0.01.
Whereas on average the willingness to pay aligns with the actuarial fair price of the annuity, this
result varies by subpopulation. Not controlling for other characteristics, Australians, females and couples
on average have a higher willingness to pay for annuities (i.e., they would purchase the annuity at a lower
price).18 The effect is larger for the engaged participants than for the participants with low engagement.
When participants are asked at which price they want to give up income to receive a lump sum the annuity
price is higher than when participants are asked at which price they would purchase income. This effect
is mitigated by information provision as the effect for the engaged subsample is much smaller than for
the subsample with low engagement. Provision of specific information in addition to the general framed
information also mitigates the influence of framing for the engaged participants.19 Participants who
respond that the survey was sometimes clear up to completely confusing indicate they would purchase an
18For females this is as expected as we used gender neutral annuity prices, making annuities more favourable for females
due to longer life expectancy. For couples this is as expected as we used for pricing that the spouse was on average three
years younger than the participant, which leads to a relatively high price for the benefits for the surviving spouse.
19We do observe a significant negative effect for the investment frame. However, this is due lower clarity of the investment
frame than the consumption frame. When omitting the participants who indicated the survey was not clear to them, the
effect of investment framing for engaged participants was 0.0004 and for consumption framing 0.0236.
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annuity at a lower price, which suggests that they understand the Guaranteed Lifetime Income product
(due to its similarities with the state pension).
Table 11 reports the parameter estimates of a panel data model with random effects. The dependent
variable is the logged money’s worth ratio as displayed in Table 7. The first three columns of Table 11
display the estimation results with all covariates. The first column reports the estimation results of all
six liquidity treatments for the Dutch sub-sample, the second column for the Australian sub-sample and
the third column for the whole sample. Columns (4) to (9) report the estimation results of each of the
six iMPL tasks separately, for the whole sample (Dutch and Australian combined).
As a robustness check, in Table 12 in the appendix we exclude the three covariates related to the
perception of the products, which were analyzed in the previous section. We perform this robustness
check as these covariates might be confounding variables, affecting both our dependent variable as well as
the perception of the product. Controlling for this confounder effect might alter the parameter estimates
of the other covariates as it excludes the effect the covariates have through the product perception on
the dependent variable. However, we observe that our results are robust to excluding the perception of
the products covariates.
In the regressions we also include the following experimental covariates. The variable WTP treatment
is an indicator variable which equals one if the participant was in the WTP treatment and zero if he
was in the WTA treatment. The variable Duration represents the logged duration (in minutes) taken
to complete the iMPL task (this attribute varies per treatment). The variable Order takes values in
the range of one to six, which represents the order in which a given iMPL within-subject treatment
was shown to the participant, given that the order of the treatments is randomized by participant. The
variable Likelihood to reduce represents the per within-subject treatment and WTP-WTA treatment
standardized response to the question described in Section 2.3.6. The dummy variables (1-2/3),...,(1/3-
0) represent the iMPL within-subject treatments. The variable SEx(1/3-0) represents the interaction
variable between self-employed and treatment 6 (an allocation of 1/3 vs 0 of retirement savings to the
Lifetime Guaranteed Income product), i.e. an indicator variable which equals one if the participant is
self-employed and answers treatment six. The variable AUx(1-2/3) represents the interaction variable
between an Australian participant and treatment 1 (an allocation of 1 vs 2/3 of the retirement savings to
the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product), i.e. an indicator variable which equals one if the participant
is Australian and has been presented with iMPL within-subject treatment 1.
Next we discuss regression results for annuity valuation distinguishing between behavioral influences
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Table 11: Money’s worth ratio regressions table
NL AU sample 1-2/3 1-1/3 1-0 2/3-1/3 2/3-0 1/3-0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Institutional settings
Australian −0.0116 −0.0775∗ 0.0239 −0.0198 −0.00612 −0.0185 −0.0246
(−0.34) (−1.80) (0.58) (−0.48) (−0.15) (−0.45) (−0.57)
Australian LOW 0.128 ∗ ∗ 0.158 ∗ ∗ 0.102 0.104 0.136∗ 0.0891 0.176 ∗ ∗
(2.03) (1.99) (1.33) (1.36) (1.78) (1.16) (2.25)
Endowment effect
WTP treatment −0.146 ∗ ∗∗ −0.140 ∗ ∗∗ −0.132 ∗ ∗∗ −0.110 ∗ ∗∗ −0.128 ∗ ∗∗ −0.150 ∗ ∗∗ −0.124 ∗ ∗∗ −0.124 ∗ ∗∗ −0.152 ∗ ∗∗
(−3.80) (−3.39) (−4.68) (−3.04) (−3.79) (−4.38) (−3.53) (−3.62) (−4.29)
WTP treatment LOW −0.106 −0.246 ∗ ∗∗ −0.197 ∗ ∗∗ −0.240 ∗ ∗∗ −0.172 ∗ ∗ −0.164 ∗ ∗ −0.212 ∗ ∗∗ −0.207 ∗ ∗∗ −0.190 ∗ ∗
(−1.18) (−2.79) (−3.17) (−3.11) (−2.31) (−2.19) (−2.82) (−2.75) (−2.46)
Information framing
Gain framing 0.0345 −0.0218 0.00760 −0.0152 0.0180 0.0158 −0.00381 0.0298 0.00948
(0.90) (−0.53) (0.27) (−0.42) (0.53) (0.46) (−0.11) (0.87) (0.27)
Consumption framing 0.0108 0.0143 0.0141 0.00857 −0.0114 0.0274 0.00516 0.0469 0.00325
(0.28) (0.35) (0.50) (0.24) (−0.34) (0.80) (0.15) (1.37) (0.09)
Gain framing LOW 0.100 0.0383 0.0892 0.141∗ 0.0997 0.120 0.0657 0.0161 0.0873
(1.06) (0.43) (1.40) (1.77) (1.29) (1.58) (0.87) (0.21) (1.12)
Consumption framing LOW −0.0728 −0.0818 −0.0877 −0.0367 −0.0527 −0.117 −0.190 ∗ ∗ −0.0611 −0.0574
(−0.78) (−0.93) (−1.38) (−0.47) (−0.69) (−1.55) (−2.50) (−0.81) (−0.73)
Financial capabilities
SA fin lit −0.0181 0.00112 −0.00760 0.00697 −0.00101 −0.0286 −0.00540 −0.0165 −0.00346
(−0.92) (0.05) (−0.53) (0.37) (−0.06) (−1.62) (−0.30) (−0.93) (−0.19)
Fin lit 0.0337 0.0153 0.0257 0.0408 0.0611 ∗ ∗ 0.00516 0.0136 0.0430 −0.00243
(1.13) (0.49) (1.18) (1.45) (2.34) (0.19) (0.50) (1.63) (−0.09)
Numeracy −0.0346 −0.00182 −0.0182 −0.0117 −0.0236 −0.00954 −0.0205 −0.0127 −0.0276
(−1.62) (−0.08) (−1.16) (−0.58) (−1.26) (−0.51) (−1.04) (−0.67) (−1.41)
SA fin lit LOW −0.0139 0.0657 ∗ ∗ 0.0137 0.00312 −0.00390 0.0200 0.0151 0.0366 0.00855
(−0.51) (2.41) (0.74) (0.13) (−0.17) (0.88) (0.65) (1.64) (0.37)
Fin lit LOW −0.0885 −0.0377 −0.0647∗ −0.0661 −0.0776∗ −0.0655 −0.0740 −0.102 ∗ ∗ −0.0110
(−1.63) (−0.69) (−1.68) (−1.41) (−1.67) (−1.47) (−1.58) (−2.18) (−0.23)
Numeracy LOW 0.123 ∗ ∗∗ −0.00668 0.0631∗ 0.0573 0.0506 0.0563 0.0886 ∗ ∗ 0.0515 0.0555
(2.69) (−0.13) (1.84) (1.35) (1.22) (1.40) (2.12) (1.22) (1.29)
Experimental design
Quiz mistakes 0.150 0.0682 0.0797 0.105 0.196 ∗ ∗ 0.0250 0.122 0.0619 −0.0147
(1.19) (0.68) (1.04) (1.08) (2.23) (0.27) (1.32) (0.69) (−0.16)
Short time 0.0768 −0.108 −0.0336 −0.0447 0.00640 −0.0381 0.00865 −0.0982 −0.0935
(0.59) (−1.08) (−0.42) (−0.45) (0.07) (−0.41) (0.09) (−1.04) (−0.97)
Short time x Quiz mistakes −0.161 0.0924 −0.00904 −0.0345 −0.148 0.0481 −0.0644 0.110 −0.0176
(−1.11) (0.69) (−0.09) (−0.30) (−1.29) (0.42) (−0.54) (0.94) (−0.15)
Confusing −0.103∗ −0.0941∗ −0.100 ∗ ∗∗ −0.0639 −0.121 ∗ ∗∗ −0.113 ∗ ∗ −0.0788∗ −0.103 ∗ ∗ −0.126 ∗ ∗∗
(−1.91) (−1.80) (−2.70) (−1.39) (−2.68) (−2.53) (−1.78) (−2.35) (−2.83)
Duration −0.00341 0.00184 −0.00167 −0.0193 −0.0352 ∗ ∗ −0.0274 −0.0189 −0.00623 −0.0176
(−0.47) (0.20) (−0.30) (−1.08) (−2.05) (−1.58) (−1.18) (−0.38) (−1.21)
Order −0.00659 0.00402 −0.00154 −0.00521 −0.0216 ∗ ∗ 0.0157 −0.0237 ∗ ∗ −0.00603 −0.00752
(−1.37) (0.78) (−0.44) (−0.48) (−2.01) (1.55) (−2.23) (−0.58) (−0.70)
Likelihood to act −0.0415 ∗ ∗∗ 0.00131 −0.0201 ∗ ∗ −0.0204 −0.00395 −0.0392 ∗ ∗ −0.0583 ∗ ∗∗ −0.0437 ∗ ∗∗ −0.0209
(−3.18) (0.10) (−2.16) (−1.16) (−0.24) (−2.37) (−3.51) (−2.62) (−1.23)
Between-subject treatments: liquidity
1-2/3 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
1-1/3 −0.0262 0.0380 ∗ ∗ −0.0202
(−1.49) (1.97) (−1.20)
1-0 −0.0155 0.0211 −0.0235
(−0.85) (1.08) (−1.38)
2/3-1/3 −0.0152 0.0374∗ −0.0148
(−0.75) (1.76) (−0.81)
2/3-0 −0.0191 0.0338 −0.0190
(−0.92) (1.59) (−1.03)
1/3-0 −0.0456 ∗ ∗ 0.00302 −0.0480 ∗ ∗
(−2.06) (0.13) (−2.46)
SEx(1/3-0) −0.0318 −0.0911∗ −0.0625∗
(−0.70) (−1.93) (−1.90)
AUx(1-2/3) −0.0499 ∗ ∗
(−2.18)
Retirement income replacement rate
Household income 0.0241 0.0485 ∗ ∗ 0.0415 ∗ ∗∗ 0.0228 0.0291 0.0591 ∗ ∗∗ 0.0410 ∗ ∗ 0.0546 ∗ ∗∗ 0.0447 ∗ ∗
(1.02) (2.38) (2.71) (1.18) (1.57) (3.17) (2.15) (2.93) (2.34)
Homeowner −0.112 ∗ ∗ 0.0248 −0.0455 −0.0493 −0.0580 −0.0346 −0.0426 −0.0410 −0.0485
(−2.41) (0.49) (−1.32) (−1.15) (−1.40) (−0.84) (−1.02) (−1.00) (−1.14)
Wealth 0.0154 −0.0128 −0.00276 0.00185 0.0126 −0.0170 −0.00630 −0.00798 −0.000817
(0.65) (−0.61) (−0.18) (0.10) (0.68) (−0.93) (−0.33) (−0.43) (−0.04)
Health & life expectancy
Health −0.00189 −0.00640 −0.00617 −0.0260 −0.0124 0.000988 −0.0201 0.0503 −0.0349
(−0.04) (−0.15) (−0.19) (−0.64) (−0.33) (0.03) (−0.52) (1.30) (−0.89)
SLE-OLE 0.00137 0.00161 0.00213 −0.000331 0.00164 0.00271 0.00414 ∗ ∗ 0.00310 0.00181
(0.60) (0.75) (1.36) (−0.17) (0.89) (1.43) (2.17) (1.64) (0.93)
Outlive partner 0.0129 −0.00649 0.000432 −0.000788 −0.00909 0.00458 0.000620 0.00348 0.00486
(1.50) (−0.81) (0.07) (−0.10) (−1.30) (0.65) (0.09) (0.49) (0.65)
Perceived product features
Understanding 0.0130 0.0232 0.0169 0.0130 0.0181 0.0361 ∗ ∗ 0.0270∗ 0.00362 0.00553
(0.81) (1.15) (1.37) (0.77) (1.21) (2.53) (1.79) (0.24) (0.37)
Riskiness 0.0142 ∗ ∗ 0.00835 0.0120 ∗ ∗∗ 0.0123 ∗ ∗ 0.0140 ∗ ∗ 0.0109 ∗ ∗ 0.00802 0.00942∗ 0.0211 ∗ ∗∗
(2.29) (1.27) (2.66) (2.11) (2.55) (2.00) (1.44) (1.70) (3.79)
Control 0.00617 0.0109∗ 0.00820 ∗ ∗ 0.00452 0.00777∗ 0.0106 ∗ ∗ 0.00807∗ 0.00984 ∗ ∗ 0.00639
(1.41) (1.85) (2.31) (0.99) (1.84) (2.46) (1.85) (2.30) (1.45)
Saving & planning
Savings habit 0.0107 0.0337 ∗ ∗ 0.0215 ∗ ∗ 0.0289 ∗ ∗ 0.0136 0.0292 ∗ ∗ 0.0234∗ 0.0135 0.0175
(0.77) (2.18) (2.11) (2.24) (1.12) (2.40) (1.87) (1.10) (1.38)
Spending horizon −0.0209 −0.0371 −0.0302 −0.0144 −0.0462 −0.0186 −0.0228 −0.0393 −0.0284
(−0.44) (−0.90) (−0.99) (−0.38) (−1.26) (−0.50) (−0.61) (−1.06) (−0.74)
Future time 0.0141 0.0117 0.0143 0.00248 0.0129 0.0259 0.0108 0.0244 0.0193
(0.70) (0.54) (0.98) (0.13) (0.74) (1.44) (0.60) (1.37) (1.04)
Fin plan −0.0573 0.0517 −0.00555 0.0160 −0.00613 0.0267 −0.0151 −0.0427 −0.0115
(−1.47) (1.15) (−0.19) (0.43) (−0.17) (0.75) (−0.41) (−1.20) (−0.31)
SA planning knowledge 0.0106 −0.0598 ∗ ∗∗ −0.0211 −0.0202 −0.0245 −0.0197 −0.0205 −0.0209 −0.0188
(0.56) (−2.91) (−1.51) (−1.13) (−1.44) (−1.19) (−1.23) (−1.25) (−1.10)
SA retirement distant 0.0237∗ −0.00718 0.00786 0.00714 0.0121 0.00453 0.00986 0.00403 0.00871
(1.95) (−0.58) (0.91) (0.66) (1.16) (0.44) (0.94) (0.39) (0.82)
Personality Traits
Conscientiousness 0.0220 −0.0370 −0.00769 0.00395 −0.0165 −0.00924 −0.00907 0.0156 −0.0285
(0.59) (−0.90) (−0.28) (0.11) (−0.50) (−0.28) (−0.26) (0.47) (−0.82)
Extrovert/Open −0.0483 −0.0329 −0.0455∗ −0.0606∗ −0.0572∗ −0.0488 0.00841 −0.0350 −0.0769 ∗ ∗
(−1.31) (−0.85) (−1.70) (−1.78) (−1.77) (−1.54) (0.26) (−1.07) (−2.30)
Agreeable/Emotional 0.00196 −0.0111 −0.00681 0.0302 −0.0230 0.00282 −0.0273 −0.0251 −0.00678
(0.05) (−0.26) (−0.24) (0.82) (−0.67) (0.08) (−0.77) (−0.72) (−0.19)
Risk −0.0129 0.00354 −0.00359 −0.00267 −0.00633 −0.00375 −0.00135 0.000601 −0.00543
(−1.52) (0.41) (−0.59) (−0.34) (−0.88) (−0.52) (−0.18) (0.08) (−0.73)
Patience 0.0189 ∗ ∗ 0.00436 0.00896 0.00983 0.00772 0.00302 0.0145∗ 0.0102 0.0118
(2.23) (0.50) (1.47) (1.25) (1.07) (0.41) (1.94) (1.39) (1.51)
Demographics
Age 0.00995∗ 0.00257 0.00587∗ 0.00694 0.0101 ∗ ∗ 0.00534 0.00785∗ 0.00137 0.00424
(1.95) (0.51) (1.65) (1.56) (2.39) (1.26) (1.80) (0.32) (0.97)
Female −0.0693∗ 0.00445 −0.0240 −0.0556 −0.0407 −0.0446 0.0171 −0.0000629 0.00223
(−1.65) (0.11) (−0.82) (−1.47) (−1.14) (−1.26) (0.47) (−0.00) (0.06)
Single 0.184 ∗ ∗∗ 0.178 ∗ ∗∗ 0.162 ∗ ∗∗ 0.114 ∗ ∗ 0.124 ∗ ∗ 0.190 ∗ ∗∗ 0.128 ∗ ∗ 0.206 ∗ ∗∗ 0.213 ∗ ∗∗
(2.96) (2.87) (3.65) (2.02) (2.34) (3.48) (2.34) (3.83) (3.85)
Children −0.00127 −0.0630 −0.0403 −0.0105 −0.0635∗ −0.0417 −0.0266 −0.0441 −0.0567
(−0.03) (−1.45) (−1.42) (−0.29) (−1.83) (−1.21) (−0.76) (−1.28) (−1.60)
Bachelor’s degree −0.0514 −0.0480 −0.0518∗ −0.0298 −0.0285 −0.0404 −0.0683 ∗ ∗ −0.0708 ∗ ∗ −0.0674∗
(−1.31) (−1.20) (−1.85) (−0.83) (−0.84) (−1.21) (−1.96) (−2.06) (−1.90)
In labor force −0.0156 −0.0217 −0.0210 0.0301 −0.0442 −0.0302 −0.0256 −0.0542 −0.0126
(−0.34) (−0.44) (−0.62) (0.70) (−1.08) (−0.74) (−0.62) (−1.32) (−0.30)
Self-employed −0.0205 −0.0465 −0.0359 −0.0570 −0.0630 0.00205 0.00765 −0.0697 −0.0970 ∗ ∗
(−0.39) (−0.83) (−0.92) (−1.13) (−1.34) (0.04) (0.16) (−1.51) (−2.02)
Constant −0.724 ∗ ∗ −0.176 −0.384 −0.492 −0.416 −0.302 −0.405 −0.170 −0.244
(−2.12) (−0.52) (−1.59) (−1.61) (−1.43) (−1.04) (−1.35) (−0.57) (−0.81)
N 6, 018 6, 000 12, 018 2, 003 2, 003 2, 003 2, 003 2, 003 2, 003
Dependent variable: logged money’s worth ratio (as displayed in Table 7); t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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(institutional settings, product endowment, information framing and financial capabilities), those in-
formed by economic (rational) influences and other factors.
4.1 Annuity valuation: main behavioral factors
The experimental design includes features to investigate to what extent behavioral factors such as prod-
uct endowment and information framing (as well as institutional setting and financial capability) are 
associated with the valuation of the Guaranteed Lifetime Income product. Moreover, we are interested 
in whether -as for the perceived product features- the engagement of the participant is important in 
explaining the behavioral factors.
It is important to remember that participants completed the iMPL tasks immediately after the per-
ceived product feature questions. In the iMPL task participants have the opportunity to receive new 
information from use of the retirement calculator on the possible income stream generated from the 
product portfolios (i.e., outcomes), depending on the assumptions they set. In addition, the “framed” 
general information (see Table 3) is repeated on each screen.
Institutional settings
Whereas for the engaged participants the real world institutional setting was important for perceived 
product features, it is not important for the valuation of the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product in 
our experiment. 
In contrast, participants with low engagement need to have a lower value of the Lifetime Guaranteed 
Income product in order to accept this product over the Flexible Account product. Hence, institutional 
settings remain important, leading to a higher valuation of the product that the less engaged participants 
are not typically able to purchase in their real world retirement income system. However, the various 
sources of information provision (presentation of product features, product knowledge quiz and retirement 
calculator) in the experiment are such that for engaged participants the effect of the real world retirement 
income system is offset. This is the case despite the complex task of valuing a lifetime income stream.
Product endowment
We observe substantial effects for the product endowment treatment (that is, WTP or WTA). When a 
participant is given an income and asked how much he requires to give up the income, the valuation of
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the Guaranteed Lifetime Income product is much higher than when he is asked how much he is willing 
to pay for the Guaranteed Lifetime Income product. This is contrary to Willig (1976) which shows that 
the price changes of willingness to pay (price changes for compensating) and willingness to accept (price 
changes for equivalent) should be very close in value, depending on the size of the income elasticity of the 
demand for the product. Given that the income effects are minor in the experimental task, one would 
expect minor effects. An explanation of the size of the treatment effect would be the lack of substitutes 
(Hanemann, 1991). This disparity between WTP and WTA is well documented in the literature (Knetsch 
and Sinden, 1984) and in the domain of valuing retirement income streams, the gap between WTA and 
WTP has been investigated in Brown et al. (2017b) and Schreiber et al. (2016) who find a WTA to WTP 
ratio of the price of a factor three to four. Our effects are much smaller than the values in those studies.
Brown et al. (2017b) and Brown et al. (2017a) both find cognition and complexity to be factors which 
can explain the high buy-sell spread. The Flexible Account product is complex as drawdown products 
have many options (investment portfolio, draw down rates) and the Guaranteed Lifetime Income product 
is complex to value as it includes inflation, compounding and longevity risk. The effect of WTP treatment 
LOW is of similar size as the effect of the treatment itself. Hence, participants with low engagement 
with the experimental task had a twice as large WTP-WTA gap than the engaged. This is supporting 
evidence that complexity might reduce the valuation of an income stream as participants who report to 
have found the experimental survey complex value the annuity less.
Our experimental setting has tried to eliminate or reduce this barrier by using the iMPL methodology 
and providing participants with a retirement calculator (which illustrates key outcomes of their decisions). 
Overall there seems to be evidence that the experimental design succeeded, as our financial capability 
measures are not significant despite the intrinsic complexity of the task. Our results supplement these 
earlier studies by showing that even after reducing the complexity of the task a WTP-WTA gap remains. 
Hence, the implication is that online tools similar to our retirement calculator or having access to financial 
advice could reduce the WTP-WTA gap, but would probably not eliminate it.
The implication is that a default for retirement savings drawdown products -which would induce 
either a WTP or a WTA frame- would play an important role in the choice between an income product 
and a drawdown product. This is also supported by the following three findings (discussed later more in 
detail). First, participants who have a high income prefer the income product, as choosing the draw down 
product would reduce their income replacement rate more due to the fixed state pension income. Second, 
Australians relative to Dutch are more reluctant to fully annuitize their retirement savings. Third, the
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self-employed who typically have to plan and organize retirement savings themselves, are reluctant to
give up any of their wealth to provide for an income just above the state pension level.
In our experimental design we are careful to control for participants’ misconceptions. First, we
included a practice round before we ask participants to complete the six experimental tasks. Second, we
included a number of explanatory variables to capture the number of mistakes in the product knowledge
quiz, an indicator of whether the participant found the experimental survey confusing, the time spent on
each within-subject iMPL treatment and the order in which the treatment was presented. Given that
order does not play an effect, the preference hypothesis identified by Plott (1996) does not seem to play
a major role in our experimental setting.
Information framing
We find that the information framing effect is not significant. For engaged participants, information
framing is both economically and statistically insignificant. However, for the low engaged, despite not
being statistically significant, information framing is economically significant with a magnitude of ap-
proximately a 9% higher or lower valuation of the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product when altering
the information frame. We note that the results are robust when excluding product features (see Table
12).
We find that for engaged participants the provision of “framed” information on top of each screen in
the iMPL task does not influence benefit choice. We suggest that this is because engaged participants
have utilized the objective information provided on various occasions prior to the iMPL tasks and in the
context of the retirement calculator.
In contrast, less engaged participants would have likely utilized less of the objective information
provided in the experimental survey and paid more attention to the “framed” information clearly visible
on the top of each screen in each of the iMPL tasks. As expected, the gain frame which highlights
the positive insurance feature against outliving one’s wealth of the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product
seems to enhance the value of the product. On the other hand, the consumption frame highlights the risk
of unexpected expenditures and therefore reduces the value of the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product
to the less engaged.
The literature on the effects of information framing on the demand for retirement benefit products is
mixed. Our result of no effect of information framing for engaged participants is despite the “framed”
information presented at the top of the screen for each of the iMPL task. However, the other experimental
survey design features, in particular the retirement calculator, were intended to encourage the participant
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think about how quickly to spent down assets, which would have reduced the complexity of the tradeoff 
they were asked to make between the portfolios in the iMPL tasks. This is supported by our finding that 
the financial capability measures are not significant.
Financial capabilities
For engaged participants, financial capabilities do not influence the valuation of the Lifetime Guaranteed 
Income product. This is in contrast to the effect financial capabilities had on the perceived riskiness 
and control of the products and in similar studies on retirement product choices. We suggest that this 
difference is due to the inclusion of a retirement calculator in conjunction with each iMPL task which 
provided engaged participants with the information they needed to make an informed choice. Hence, the 
engaged participant utilized information not only on the features of the product, but also the possible 
income stream it could generate, conditional on assumptions the participant could alter.
In contrast, financial capabilities do play a role in the valuation of the Lifetime Guaranteed Income 
product for low engaged participants. For low engaged Dutch participants, having low numeracy skills 
decreases their valuation of the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product, likely because these participants 
underestimate the income the Flexible Account product can deliver. This effect is not present for low 
engaged Australians, as they are likely more aware, from peers with experience of the predominant 
flexible drawdown products, of the risk of outliving one’s wealth. Therefore, they would more likely 
consider a more conservative drawdown strategy for the Flexible Account product than low engaged 
Dutch participants.
Better financial literacy skills, especially for low engaged Dutch participants participants could suggest 
that they consider themselves more capable to invest in the stock market and therefore value the Flexible 
Account product more. In addition, for the low engaged Dutch participant, better financial literacy 
skills help participants to understand the product they are less familiar with. For Australians higher 
self-assessed financial literacy could suggest that they understand the product they are less familiar with 
even though they have not utilized all the information that was available to them in the experimental 
task.
4.2 Annuity valuation: main rational factors
Between-subject treatments: liquidity
The six within-subject iMPL treatments with varying portfolio compositions (and therefore access to 
liquidity) can be used to examine the effect of the lack of substitutes (Hanemann, 1991). An income stream
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is typically irreversible and only by saving from the income can a participant slowly increase his liquid
wealth again. Although the wealth in a Flexible Account product could be used to purchase an annuity
after retirement, this rarely occurs in practice. The voluntary annuity market in the Netherlands and
Australia is small. Therefore, most participants would consider the decision between product portfolios
to be an irreversible decision. Substitutes for income (except the state pension and the imputed rent
from owning a home) and wealth are scarce for retirees. Given that retirement savings are a sizeable
proportion of their asset holdings, the allocation decision could have substantial welfare effects if the
participant faced a large disutility from a non-optimal product mix.
For the Dutch sub-sample we observe from the within-subject treatment effects that participants
would prefer not to diversify. The treatment 1-2/3 (base case) has the highest valuation by the Dutch
participants. However, the treatment effects are not significant except for the other extreme treatment
1/3-0. This does however signal that the Dutch participants would generally have a larger disutility from
giving up some of their income in exchange for liquid wealth than for giving up a similar amount of their
income in exchange for liquid wealth when they already have a lower income and more liquid wealth. As
the Flexible Account product would provide flexibility for unexpected expenses, one would expect the
participants to value this feature more when they have most of their wealth in the inflexible Guaranteed
Lifetime Income product. This result can also be interpreted as the Dutch preferring to stick to their
real world retirement income system (of full annuitization). This is contrary to the 1-2/3 portfolio where
the Dutch participant might stick with the preference to the simplicity of managing an income product,
the 1/3-0 portfolio would induce the participant to consider how to manage the wealth in the Flexible
Account product. This does reduce the valuation of the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product for the
Dutch sub-sample.
Compared to the Dutch, the Australian participants do value income less when they have to fully
annuitize their retirement wealth than when they have to partly annuitize. However, they too have a
tendency to stick to their real world retirement drawdown system, as they also value the income less in the
case they have to annuitize part of their retirement wealth (treatment 1/3-0) or if they have the option
between only income and only liquid wealth in addition to income at the state pension level (treatment
1-0).
We also test the product endowment differences between the Dutch and Australian sub-samples
in column (3) of Table 11 which includes the interaction term between being Australian and the 1-
2/3 treatment. As expected, we observe that the Dutch value the additional income much more than
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Australians when they already have a sizeable income. Similarly, using the interaction term between 
being self-employed and treatment 1/3-0, we test whether the self-employed do not want to give any of 
their accumulated wealth up for an income. Again, our results support our hypothesis, although this is 
not significant for the Dutch sub-sample. This might be due to Dutch self-employed, who had in the past 
accumulated a DB pension, reducing the product endowment.
Retirement income replacement rate
A participant’s financial capabilities or labor market participation does not have a significant influence 
on the valuation of the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product. Nor does liquid (non-housing and non-
retirement) wealth. However, the income replacement rate does play a role. Participants who have a high 
income do value the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product more. Participants who own their home derive 
an imputed income from it which would equate to the cost of renting the property. Since in retirement, 
mortgage repayments are typically much lower than earlier in the life cycle, the difference in replacement 
rate would be smaller for homeowners than for renters, making them value the lifetime Guaranteed 
Income product less. This is in line with empirical observations in, for example, the U.K.20 and Australia 
that people tend to take small pension pots as a lump sum whereas larger pots are either annuitized 
or converted into an income product. In addition, it could be driven by the finding in Goldstein et al.
(2016) that people tend to undervalue an annuity when the income of the annuity is small, but overvalue 
it when it is large.
Health and life expectancy: the money’s worth
We can use our collected covariates to investigate the extent to which the participant’s choice is driven by 
monetary reasons (that is, choosing a portfolio as it is good value for money) or the extent to which it is 
driven by an intrinsic preference for one product over the other (that is the perceived product features).
A Lifetime Guaranteed Income product would be good value for money if the participant is in good 
health and expects to live long. However, as indicated in Table 9, the three measures relating to life 
expectancy in the “health and life expectancy” category are all not significant. This would indicate that 
the participant’s choice for the portfolio of retirement benefit products is not driven by their (private) 
information on their expected remaining lifetime. We note that the SLE-OLE measure typically has the 
expected sign in the regressions (and is significant in regression (7) too at a level of significance of 5%), 
indicating that there might be a small effect that people who expect to live longer would find a lifetime 
guaranteed income more preferable.
20Financial Conduct Authority Data bulletin (10) reports that 86% of people with pension pots of less than £10,000 chose
full cash withdrawals whereas 90% of people with pension pots over £250,000 chose annuities or drawdown products.
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Perceived product features
The perceived product features Riskiness and Control have a significant effect on the preference for
the Guaranteed Lifetime Income product relative to the Flexible Account product. This indicates that
people who see the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product relative to the Flexible Account as having more
attractive features do value the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product more. This would indicate that the
utility derived from the product would also have an influence on the preference for the products.
4.3 Annuity valuation: other factors
Many of the parameter estimates related to personal characteristics, both variables related to saving &
planning and personality traits, are not significant for the valuation of annuities at a 5% significance
level.
In the Dutch sub-sample those who are more patient prefer the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product
more. People who are less patient can use the money in the Flexible Account to consume more today.
Although Patience is not significant for the Australian sub-sample, Savings habit is. Since people who
have better savings habits also tend to be more patient, and Australians who are better savers (and
thus typically more patient) tend to prefer the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product more. Moreover,
Australians with high levels of self-assessed planning knowledge are more likely to prefer the Flexible
Account product more.
Gender generally has no significant effect, even though women tend to live longer than men. The sign
for Females is negative, which would even imply that women, who live longer, would value the Lifetime
Guaranteed Income product less than males. However, the gender differences in life expectancy was also
expected to have a minor effect given that the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product is a joint and survivor
annuity and not a single life annuity.
Of the demographic variables, only the variable Single is significant at a 5% level. The effect of being
single rather than living together could be that singles prefer an income more than people in a couple. In
a couple there would be more opportunity for home production, which could be interpreted in economic
terms as an income. However, one does have to be careful interpreting this variable as there is also a
pricing difference between a joint and survivor annuity and a single life annuity. Hence, it could also be
that participants who are part of a couple value the survivor benefit less than our calculated price.
Experimental design: active participant
People who have the opportunity to exercise more choice in the real world retirement system do prefer the
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Guaranteed Lifetime Income product less. However, as the retirement system and the choice menu are 
different in the two countries, there are other variables which are significant in our regression. Australians 
have ample choice and those who prefer to exercise it would typically indicate that they have a good 
retirement planning knowledge. Contrary to Australians, the Dutch do not have choice of retirement 
investments: these are decided by the fiduciary (typically a pension fund). However, people can choose 
to exercise the option to retire early. Hence, for those who exercise the option retirement is not distant 
and they value the Lifetime Guaranteed income product less.
5 Conclusions and policy implications
This paper investigates the stated attractiveness of partial and full annuitization. We use an experimental 
survey to elicit an individual’s willingness to pay or willingness to accept annuities in a setting where 
participants choose a preferred allocation of two retirement benefit products - a lifetime annuity (which 
we call Guaranteed Lifetime Income product) and a phased withdrawal product (which we call a Flex-
ible Account product). To assist participants make informed choices, we reduce the cognitive difficulty 
associated with choice of allocations of complex and likely unfamiliar products by: providing detailed 
information about the features of the two products; implementing an incentivized product knowledge test 
with feedback; using the iMPL methodology to reduce the cognitive complexity of the valuation task; 
and by providing a retirement calculator to illustrate the retirement income implications of the chosen 
portfolio of retirement benefit products.
The experimental survey was conducted in two countries - Australia and the Netherlands - which allows 
investigation of the impact of real world institutional differences. The former operates a DC pension 
system, with choice of retirement benefit (which includes flexible drawdowns), while the latter is 
predominantly a DB pension system with mandatory annuitization.
There are several recurring themes in our analysis of the perceived understanding and perceptions of 
product features of the retirement benefit products. First, the impact of information framing is minimal for 
Australians who have “real world” familiarity with a Flexible Account-type retirement benefit product 
through mandatory pension system and with a Lifetime Guaranteed Income-type product from the state 
pension. However, for the Dutch sub-sample, who have no “real world” familiarity with a Flexible Account-
type retirement benefit, information framing does influence the perception of the retirement benefit 
products introduced in the experimental context. Second, those participants who are financially competent 
and are engaged with the experimental task are better able to understand the features of the
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products, which confirms findings in Bateman et al. (2016a). Third, those participants who have thought 
more about retirement planning and have a need for income in retirement have more understanding of 
the Lifetime Guaranteed Income product. Finally, comparing Australian participants with Dutch par-
ticipants, the former have a more favorable perception of the Flexible Account product relative to the 
Lifetime Guaranteed Income product. This is likely be due to the lack of familiarity with annuity-type 
products in the real world institutional arrangements in which drawdown products are almost always 
taken and the voluntary annuity market has been, until recently, almost non-existent (Iskhakov et al., 
2015).
In terms of the valuation of lifetime annuities we find a product endowment effect, identified as a gap 
between the “willingness to pay (WTP)” and “willingness to accept (WTA)”, which is twice as large for 
participants with low engagement in the experimental task as for engaged participants. However, in general 
the WTP-WTA gap in our experimental survey is much smaller than in previous experimental settings 
(such as Brown et al., 2017a). This could be due to the experimental design which included a simple 
retirement calculator (indicating outcomes in terms of the impact on potential spending in retirement of 
the income streams corresponding to individual’s choices) to reduce cognitive effort.
While we do find a product endowment effect, we find no information framing effect on the valuation 
of annuities, despite presentation of key product information in four different frames -consumption gain, 
consumption loss, investment gain and investment loss. Our experimental design, which provides repeated 
opportunities to learn about the products, and the frame-neutral detailed product descriptions (in con-
junction with the framed general descriptions), successfully eliminate the potential information framing 
effects for most participants. The exception are those participants with low engagement with the exper-
imental survey, where we observe that the gain frame is associated with a higher valuation of annuities.
We also find that participants do not determine their preference for annuities relative to drawdown 
products based on money’s worth, but rather on whether the product provides them with utility. For 
example, the variables we collect that relate to (subjective) life expectancy do not explain an individual’s 
preference for annuities, whereas product perceptions, in terms of riskiness or control, do explain their 
preferences. Moreover, people with higher retirement savings are more willing to annuitize. This can be 
explained by the illusion of wealth, as well as the lessor impact of the state pension on the retirement 
income replacement ratio for those on high incomes.
Overall our findings suggest three key lessons for policy and product development. First, the effects of 
familiarity with current products and policy settings are strong, so it cannot be assumed that people will
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fully understand the features and implications of “new” products and policies. Second, clear presentation
of basic information on retirement benefit product features is essential to minimize the effects of informa-
tion framing. Third, financial advice, (such as via the pre-populated online calculator we provide) that 
presents details of the rest of lifetime implications of alternative product allocations, should be available at 
the time of product allocation, in order to facilitate informed choice.
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A Robustness check
Table 12: Robustness check Annuity factor Regression table
NL AU sample 1-2/3 1-1/3 1-0 2/3-1/3 2/3-0 1/3-0
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Institutional settings
Australian −0.0374 −0.0957 ∗ ∗ −0.00268 −0.0528 −0.0311 −0.0437 −0.0510
(−1.10) (−2.27) (−0.07) (−1.29) (−0.76) (−1.08) (−1.22)
Australian LOW 0.143 ∗ ∗ 0.169 ∗ ∗ 0.118 0.118 0.147∗ 0.108 0.197 ∗ ∗
(2.27) (2.13) (1.55) (1.56) (1.94) (1.41) (2.52)
Endowment effect
WTP treatment −0.143 ∗ ∗∗ −0.140 ∗ ∗∗ −0.131 ∗ ∗∗ −0.108 ∗ ∗∗ −0.127 ∗ ∗∗ −0.150 ∗ ∗∗ −0.124 ∗ ∗∗ −0.123 ∗ ∗∗ −0.151 ∗ ∗∗
(−3.74) (−3.38) (−4.63) (−3.00) (−3.73) (−4.36) (−3.52) (−3.59) (−4.23)
WTP treatment LOW −0.103 −0.246 ∗ ∗∗ −0.196 ∗ ∗∗ −0.240 ∗ ∗∗ −0.170 ∗ ∗ −0.162 ∗ ∗ −0.210 ∗ ∗∗ −0.205 ∗ ∗∗ −0.186 ∗ ∗
(−1.13) (−2.79) (−3.13) (−3.09) (−2.28) (−2.15) (−2.78) (−2.72) (−2.40)
Information framing
Gain framing 0.0422 −0.0214 0.0113 −0.0110 0.0221 0.0198 −0.000848 0.0313 0.0153
(1.10) (−0.51) (0.40) (−0.30) (0.65) (0.58) (−0.02) (0.91) (0.43)
Consumption framing 0.00617 0.0159 0.0138 0.00695 −0.0119 0.0280 0.00556 0.0475 0.00114
(0.16) (0.39) (0.49) (0.19) (−0.35) (0.82) (0.16) (1.39) (0.03)
Gain framing LOW 0.0869 0.0360 0.0795 0.133∗ 0.0898 0.105 0.0542 0.0112 0.0780
(0.91) (0.41) (1.24) (1.66) (1.16) (1.37) (0.71) (0.14) (1.00)
Consumption framing LOW −0.0736 −0.0879 −0.0902 −0.0385 −0.0563 −0.119 −0.191 ∗ ∗ −0.0651 −0.0628
(−0.79) (−1.00) (−1.42) (−0.49) (−0.73) (−1.56) (−2.51) (−0.86) (−0.80)
Financial capabilities
SA fin lit −0.0186 0.000238 −0.00853 0.00600 −0.00211 −0.0301∗ −0.00650 −0.0165 −0.00470
(−0.93) (0.01) (−0.59) (0.32) (−0.12) (−1.69) (−0.36) (−0.93) (−0.26)
Fin lit 0.0408 0.0123 0.0282 0.0448 0.0645 ∗ ∗ 0.00515 0.0131 0.0435∗ 0.00575
(1.40) (0.40) (1.32) (1.60) (2.51) (0.20) (0.49) (1.66) (0.21)
Numeracy −0.0344 −0.00355 −0.0184 −0.00985 −0.0232 −0.0120 −0.0224 −0.0145 −0.0235
(−1.62) (−0.16) (−1.19) (−0.50) (−1.26) (−0.64) (−1.15) (−0.78) (−1.21)
SA fin lit LOW −0.0141 0.0656 ∗ ∗ 0.0120 0.00261 −0.00528 0.0175 0.0132 0.0345 0.00851
(−0.52) (2.42) (0.65) (0.11) (−0.23) (0.78) (0.57) (1.55) (0.37)
Fin lit LOW −0.0897∗ −0.0377 −0.0646∗ −0.0677 −0.0783∗ −0.0624 −0.0711 −0.101 ∗ ∗ −0.0161
(−1.66) (−0.69) (−1.69) (−1.45) (−1.69) (−1.41) (−1.52) (−2.15) (−0.34)
Numeracy LOW 0.125 ∗ ∗∗ −0.00205 0.0660∗ 0.0585 0.0538 0.0609 0.0920 ∗ ∗ 0.0548 0.0575
(2.71) (−0.04) (1.92) (1.37) (1.29) (1.51) (2.19) (1.30) (1.34)
Experimental design
Quiz mistakes 0.144 0.0810 0.0790 0.101 0.192 ∗ ∗ 0.0300 0.126 0.0603 −0.0269
(1.12) (0.81) (1.02) (1.04) (2.17) (0.32) (1.35) (0.67) (−0.29)
Short time 0.0657 −0.106 −0.0408 −0.0510 0.0000139 −0.0474 0.00219 −0.102 −0.103
(0.49) (−1.06) (−0.50) (−0.51) (0.00) (−0.51) (0.02) (−1.08) (−1.06)
Short time x Quiz mistakes −0.166 0.0924 −0.00895 −0.0323 −0.146 0.0480 −0.0642 0.110 −0.0122
(−1.12) (0.70) (−0.09) (−0.28) (−1.26) (0.42) (−0.53) (0.94) (−0.11)
Confusing −0.108 ∗ ∗ −0.0866∗ −0.0996 ∗ ∗∗ −0.0655 −0.121 ∗ ∗∗ −0.110 ∗ ∗ −0.0763∗ −0.101 ∗ ∗ −0.128 ∗ ∗∗
(−1.98) (−1.66) (−2.67) (−1.42) (−2.69) (−2.47) (−1.72) (−2.30) (−2.86)
Duration −0.00251 0.00171 −0.00117 −0.0159 −0.0308∗ −0.0262 −0.0169 −0.00529 −0.00955
(−0.35) (0.19) (−0.21) (−0.92) (−1.85) (−1.52) (−1.07) (−0.32) (−0.66)
Order −0.00629 0.00398 −0.00137 −0.00345 −0.0209∗ 0.0153 −0.0229 ∗ ∗ −0.00621 −0.00361
(−1.31) (0.78) (−0.39) (−0.32) (−1.96) (1.50) (−2.15) (−0.60) (−0.34)
Likelihood to act −0.0423 ∗ ∗∗ 0.00130 −0.0205 ∗ ∗ −0.0224 −0.00693 −0.0407 ∗ ∗ −0.0598 ∗ ∗∗ −0.0439 ∗ ∗∗ −0.0241
(−3.24) (0.10) (−2.20) (−1.28) (−0.41) (−2.45) (−3.59) (−2.63) (−1.42)
Between-subject treatments: liquidity
1-2/3 0 0 0
(.) (.) (.)
1-1/3 −0.0262 0.0380 ∗ ∗ −0.0201
(−1.49) (1.97) (−1.20)
1-0 −0.0155 0.0212 −0.0235
(−0.84) (1.08) (−1.38)
2/3-1/3 −0.0151 0.0374∗ −0.0148
(−0.75) (1.76) (−0.81)
2/3-0 −0.0190 0.0338 −0.0190
(−0.92) (1.59) (−1.03)
1/3-0 −0.0456 ∗ ∗ 0.00303 −0.0481 ∗ ∗
(−2.06) (0.13) (−2.46)
SEx(1/3-0) −0.0317 −0.0911∗ −0.0624∗
(−0.70) (−1.93) (−1.90)
AUx(1-2/3) −0.0499 ∗ ∗
(−2.17)
Retirement income replacement rate
Household income 0.0329 0.0495 ∗ ∗ 0.0465 ∗ ∗∗ 0.0274 0.0347∗ 0.0650 ∗ ∗∗ 0.0453 ∗ ∗ 0.0580 ∗ ∗∗ 0.0514 ∗ ∗∗
(1.39) (2.44) (3.02) (1.42) (1.87) (3.46) (2.38) (3.11) (2.68)
Homeowner −0.109 ∗ ∗ 0.0215 −0.0448 −0.0479 −0.0567 −0.0367 −0.0443 −0.0390 −0.0431
(−2.35) (0.43) (−1.30) (−1.12) (−1.38) (−0.90) (−1.07) (−0.95) (−1.01)
Wealth 0.0134 −0.0140 −0.00431 −0.0000709 0.0105 −0.0180 −0.00698 −0.00894 −0.00467
(0.56) (−0.67) (−0.28) (−0.00) (0.57) (−0.98) (−0.36) (−0.48) (−0.24)
Health & life expectancy
Health −0.00139 −0.00513 −0.00614 −0.0255 −0.0118 0.00361 −0.0182 0.0482 −0.0368
(−0.03) (−0.12) (−0.19) (−0.64) (−0.31) (0.10) (−0.47) (1.25) (−0.94)
SLE-OLE 0.00151 0.00152 0.00215 −0.000248 0.00169 0.00263 0.00408 ∗ ∗ 0.00308 0.00202
(0.65) (0.71) (1.37) (−0.13) (0.92) (1.38) (2.14) (1.63) (1.03)
Outlive partner 0.0137 −0.00606 0.000911 −0.000605 −0.00859 0.00539 0.00128 0.00415 0.00497
(1.59) (−0.76) (0.15) (−0.08) (−1.23) (0.76) (0.18) (0.59) (0.67)
Saving & planning
Savings habit 0.00959 0.0321 ∗ ∗ 0.0201 ∗ ∗ 0.0278 ∗ ∗ 0.0119 0.0272 ∗ ∗ 0.0219∗ 0.0126 0.0161
(0.69) (2.07) (1.97) (2.16) (0.99) (2.23) (1.76) (1.03) (1.27)
Spending horizon −0.0266 −0.0352 −0.0302 −0.0136 −0.0459 −0.0200 −0.0240 −0.0393 −0.0257
(−0.56) (−0.86) (−0.99) (−0.35) (−1.25) (−0.54) (−0.65) (−1.06) (−0.67)
Future time 0.0148 0.0118 0.0145 0.00239 0.0128 0.0266 0.0114 0.0241 0.0184
(0.73) (0.54) (0.99) (0.13) (0.74) (1.47) (0.63) (1.35) (0.98)
Fin plan −0.0581 0.0482 −0.00872 0.0127 −0.0103 0.0225 −0.0183 −0.0439 −0.0156
(−1.49) (1.08) (−0.30) (0.34) (−0.29) (0.63) (−0.50) (−1.23) (−0.42)
SA planning knowledge 0.0122 −0.0592 ∗ ∗∗ −0.0195 −0.0187 −0.0222 −0.0169 −0.0184 −0.0204 −0.0171
(0.63) (−2.89) (−1.39) (−1.05) (−1.31) (−1.02) (−1.10) (−1.21) (−1.00)
SA retirement distant 0.0235∗ −0.00663 0.00821 0.00751 0.0125 0.00475 0.0101 0.00447 0.00943
(1.93) (−0.54) (0.95) (0.69) (1.20) (0.46) (0.97) (0.43) (0.88)
Personality Traits
Conscientiousness 0.0294 −0.0443 −0.00716 0.00545 −0.0159 −0.0101 −0.00955 0.0160 −0.0257
(0.79) (−1.06) (−0.26) (0.15) (−0.48) (−0.30) (−0.28) (0.48) (−0.74)
Extrovert/Open −0.0444 −0.0301 −0.0418 −0.0577∗ −0.0533∗ −0.0446 0.0115 −0.0319 −0.0719 ∗ ∗
(−1.20) (−0.77) (−1.56) (−1.69) (−1.65) (−1.40) (0.35) (−0.97) (−2.14)
Agreeable/Emotional 0.00239 −0.00743 −0.00406 0.0337 −0.0199 0.00475 −0.0261 −0.0240 −0.000528
(0.06) (−0.18) (−0.14) (0.92) (−0.58) (0.14) (−0.74) (−0.69) (−0.01)
Risk −0.0167 ∗ ∗ 0.00136 −0.00654 −0.00514 −0.00940 −0.00755 −0.00414 −0.00160 −0.00872
(−1.99) (0.16) (−1.09) (−0.67) (−1.32) (−1.07) (−0.56) (−0.22) (−1.16)
Patience 0.0191 ∗ ∗ 0.00451 0.00904 0.00997 0.00784 0.00308 0.0145∗ 0.0103 0.0118
(2.26) (0.52) (1.49) (1.27) (1.09) (0.42) (1.94) (1.39) (1.52)
Demographics
Age 0.0105 ∗ ∗ 0.00223 0.00598∗ 0.00698 0.0102 ∗ ∗ 0.00550 0.00795∗ 0.00145 0.00435
(2.04) (0.44) (1.68) (1.56) (2.40) (1.29) (1.82) (0.33) (0.99)
Female −0.0683 −0.00233 −0.0260 −0.0568 −0.0432 −0.0501 0.0127 −0.00168 0.00247
(−1.63) (−0.06) (−0.89) (−1.51) (−1.22) (−1.42) (0.35) (−0.05) (0.07)
Single 0.194 ∗ ∗∗ 0.183 ∗ ∗∗ 0.167 ∗ ∗∗ 0.120 ∗ ∗ 0.130 ∗ ∗ 0.198 ∗ ∗∗ 0.134 ∗ ∗ 0.209 ∗ ∗∗ 0.219 ∗ ∗∗
(3.11) (2.93) (3.76) (2.11) (2.46) (3.61) (2.45) (3.90) (3.93)
Children −0.00408 −0.0678 −0.0453 −0.0142 −0.0682∗ −0.0486 −0.0316 −0.0478 −0.0613∗
(−0.11) (−1.56) (−1.59) (−0.39) (−1.96) (−1.41) (−0.90) (−1.39) (−1.73)
Bachelor’s degree −0.0483 −0.0482 −0.0505∗ −0.0265 −0.0259 −0.0403 −0.0684 ∗ ∗ −0.0713 ∗ ∗ −0.0613∗
(−1.24) (−1.21) (−1.81) (−0.74) (−0.77) (−1.20) (−1.97) (−2.09) (−1.73)
In labor force −0.0226 −0.0235 −0.0242 0.0273 −0.0477 −0.0354 −0.0294 −0.0550 −0.0157
(−0.49) (−0.48) (−0.71) (0.64) (−1.17) (−0.86) (−0.72) (−1.34) (−0.37)
Self-employed −0.0176 −0.0433 −0.0346 −0.0553 −0.0612 0.00240 0.00752 −0.0689 −0.0927∗
(−0.33) (−0.77) (−0.89) (−1.10) (−1.30) (0.05) (0.16) (−1.49) (−1.94)
Constant −0.743 ∗ ∗ −0.131 −0.359 −0.484 −0.401 −0.266 −0.385 −0.153 −0.253
(−2.16) (−0.38) (−1.49) (−1.59) (−1.38) (−0.91) (−1.28) (−0.51) (−0.84)
N 6, 018 6, 000 12, 018 2, 003 2, 003 2, 003 2, 003 2, 003 2, 003
Dependent variable: logged money’s worth ratio (as displayed in Table 7); t statistics in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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